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MEDIA CONSOLIDATION & POLITICAL 
POLARIZATION:  REVIEWING THE NATIONAL 
TELEVISION OWNERSHIP RULE 
Mary R. Hornak* 
 
Local television plays an important role in the democratic society.  The 
medium is viewed as being trustworthy, and it is accessible and uniquely 
situated to report on matters of local interest.  Among other roles, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) regulates firms’ ownership interests in 
the media through regulations that permit a certain degree of consolidation 
at both the local and national levels.  Since 1996, Congress has mandated 
that the FCC regularly review broadcast media ownership regulations.  
Originally, this requirement mandated biennial review.  In 2004, however, 
Congress revised the mandate, requiring review on a quadrennial basis and 
excluding from such review only the regulation limiting broadcast television 
firms’ ownership interests at the national level—the national television 
ownership rule. 
Since then, permissive regulations and the financial state of the local 
broadcast television industry have promoted consolidation among firms, and 
commentary suggests this consolidation has contributed to political 
polarization.  A case study of the impact of one firm’s acquisition of affiliates 
demonstrates the relationship between consolidation and polarization, while 
the firm’s recent attempted acquisition demonstrates the stakes of the 
transactions the national television ownership rule currently permits. 
Balancing First Amendment guarantees viewed in light of the 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor with concerns raised by commentary 
identifying a link between consolidation and political polarization, this Note 
asserts that the regulations governing national limits on broadcast television 
ownership should be subject to regular review alongside other broadcast 
media regulations, beginning with the FCC’s next quadrennial review.  
Beyond this recommendation, this Note proposes moderate amendments to 
the rule and presents additional mitigating measures that could alternatively 
address the policy concerns underlying this Note’s proposals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Viewpoint diversity, which refers to the availability of media conveying a 
range of different perspectives, is a “central puzzle” that both complicates 
and guides media law.1  Such diversity is exceedingly difficult to objectively 
measure, monitor, and maintain,2 yet its promotion serves a critical role in 
the democratic society,3 as a media landscape that conveys diverse 
viewpoints expands democratic participation and advances voter 
 
 1. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Consolidation:  An 
Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781, 792, 798 (2009). 
 2. See id. at 790–98. 
 3. See Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, The First Amendment, and 
Democracy’s Future, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1551 (2008) (identifying the media’s 
“essential function” as minimizing the difficulties citizens face in monitoring government); 
see also John Sands, Local News Is More Trusted Than National News—But That Could 
Change, KNIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://knightfoundation.org/articles/local-news-is-
more-trusted-than-national-news-but-that-could-change/ [https://perma.cc/F6KE-6QK7]. 
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knowledge.4  Practically, individuals rely on the media to provide them with 
the information they need to effectively “participate in the political process” 
and maintain the accountability of government actors.5  The media ownership 
rules promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the 
agency empowered to regulate the communications industry, strive to 
promote this diversity.6  Beyond viewpoint diversity, the FCC’s rules also 
seek to promote competition and localism, the latter of which measures the 
extent to which broadcasters respond to individual communities’ needs and 
interests.7 
Compared to the press that existed when the First Amendment was 
ratified,8 today’s “press” includes a broader range of outlets, including radio, 
television, and digital media.  Collectively, these media contribute to a 
seemingly endless supply of news and information.  Today, constituents’ 
relationship with information outlets has been particularly fraught.  In 
addition to the industry’s saturation, leaders have propagated mistrust in the 
media,9 and misinformation has spread across digital10 and traditional 
 
 4. Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 812. 
 5. See Clara Hendrickson, Local Journalism in Crisis:  Why America Must Revive Its 
Local Newsrooms, BROOKINGS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/local-
journalism-in-crisis-why-america-must-revive-its-local-newsrooms/ [https://perma.cc/97SR-
E7LD]. 
 6. The FCC seeks to promote: 1) diversity of viewpoints, 2) diversity of programming, 
3) outlet diversity, and 4) minority and female ownership of outlets. DANA A. SCHERER, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R43936, THE FCC’S RULES AND POLICIES REGARDING MEDIA OWNERSHIP, 
ATTRIBUTION, AND OWNERSHIP DIVERSITY 1 (2016). 
 7. Id.; see also FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1155 (2021) (“The 
FCC has long explained that the ownership rules seek to promote competition, localism, and 
viewpoint diversity by ensuring that a small number of entities do not dominate a particular 
media market.”). 
 8. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MEDIA LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (9th ed. 2016) 
(noting that in 1790 when the First Amendment was ratified, the “press” included only about 
one hundred newspapers, which were almost all operated by local printers). 
 9. See Stephen J. Wermiel, Freedom of the Press:  Challenges to This Pillar of 
Democracy, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
public_education/publications/insights-on-law-and-society/volume-19/insights-vol-19-issue-
2/freedom-of-the-press/ [https://perma.cc/9L5U-VXVV] (“President Donald Trump attacks 
the credibility of the media almost daily.”); see also Megan Brenan, Americans Remain 
Distrustful of Mass Media, GALLUP (Sept. 30, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/321116/ 
americans-remain-distrustful-mass-media.aspx [https://perma.cc/7KB4-M3UK] 
(“Americans’ confidence in the media to report the news fairly, accurately and fully has been 
persistently low for over a decade and shows no signs of improving, as Republicans’ and 
Democrats’ trust moves in opposite directions.”); Adam Satariano, Republican Distrust of 
News May Be Helping Election Misinformation Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2020,  
9:51 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/technology/republicans-distrust-news-
media.html [https://perma.cc/54UG-NC53];  
 10. According to a 2019–2020 Gallup poll, 74 percent of Americans consider the spread 
of misinformation over the internet to be “a major problem.” Megan Brenan & Helen Stubbs, 
News Media Viewed as Biased but Crucial to Democracy, GALLUP (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/316574/news-media-viewed-biased-crucial-democracy.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/DWVZAP]; see also Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Growth of Sinclair’s 
Conservative Media Empire, NEW YORKER (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/22/the-growth-of-sinclairs-conservative-
media-empire [https://perma.cc/X9LT-GFQC]. 
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platforms alike.11  Further, increasing political polarization and slanted or 
biased news coverage have, in the eyes of many viewers, engendered further 
political division in the United States.12  While viewpoint diversity has been 
understood to create a media environment in which the truth may be realized 
through the consideration of competing views,13 the prevalence of 
misinformation and the decreased objectivity of some news sources have 
called into question this competitive safety net by “prevent[ing] the actual 
battle [of ideas] from being fought” in the first place.14  Faced with a market 
of information in which the distinction between objective facts and biased 
assertions has become increasingly unclear, it is possible that people have 
“simply give[n] up” and stopped trusting or even consuming the news.15 
In this overwhelming media landscape, local television news remains an 
important information source.16  Local television news stations disseminate 
information of local and regional interest,17 and broadcasts are uniquely 
accessible because the cost of a cable subscription is not a barrier.18  Further, 
viewers report that they generally trust local television news more than they 
trust other sources.19  Despite the importance of the medium to local 
audiences, local television stands on unsteady ground in nonelection years.  
Notably, a 2018 media viewership study conducted by the Pew Research 
Center suggested that many local stations’ financial hardships are unknown 
to viewers.20  In fact, that study found that 71 percent of U.S. adults believed 
their local news stations were “doing very or somewhat well financially,”21 
 
 11. Megan Garber, Fox News Hits a Dangerous New Low, ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/11/fox-news-trump-election-dangerous-
new-low/617019/ [https://perma.cc/SUQ4-SJW6]. 
 12. Brenan & Stubbs, supra note 10; cf. Wermiel, supra note 9 (“Cable organizations are 
labeled as liberal or conservative instead of just news.”). 
 13. See infra notes 151–61 and accompanying text. 
 14. Emily Bazelon, The Problem of Free Speech in an Age of Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/magazine/free-speech.html 
[https://perma.cc/LF5Q-GZYP] (clarifying that the internet is not solely responsible for the 
spread of misinformation). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 25; DANA A. SCHERER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R45338, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (FCC) MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES 5–6 
(2021). 
 17. See For Local News, Americans Embrace Digital but Still Want Strong Community 
Connection, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Americans Embrace Digital], 
https://www.journalism.org/2019/03/26/for-local-news-americans-embrace-digital-but-still-
want-strong-community-connection/ [https://perma.cc/L5BN-V8QB]. 
 18. Viewers can access broadcast television without a subscription by connecting an 
antenna to their television, see, e.g., Brian X. Chen, How to Watch the Super Bowl When You 
Don’t Have Cable, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/ 
technology/personaltech/how-to-watch-the-super-bowl-when-you-dont-have-cable.html 
[https://perma.cc/5H68-F9KX], or by using a local affiliate’s app, see News App, LOCAL 12, 
https://local12.com/station/news-app [https://perma.cc/JM7V-6JN7] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021). 
 19. Kolhatkar, supra note 10. 
 20. See Americans Embrace Digital, supra note 17. 
 21. Id. 
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even amid then-declining revenues in the local television news market.22  
While local television news stations enjoyed audience increases and 
improved overall revenue generation in 2020, such success was considered 
to be “consistent with a cyclical pattern in which revenue rises in election 
years.”23 
The financial challenges local stations face, particularly in nonelection 
years, almost certainly make consolidated ownership more attractive,24 and 
academic studies of the effects of consolidation in broadcast and digital 
media present a warning regarding the effects of consolidated control.25  
These studies demonstrate that the costs of consolidation may include 
decreased content quality and increased polarization.26  Given the importance 
of objectivity and quality in journalism and news media, the organization and 
state of the current media landscape raises a few questions:  Should mergers 
of media firms that affect ownership of local television news stations 
continue to be permitted?  Could increased government oversight protect the 
local press? 
One of the FCC regulations that directly supervises firms’ ownership 
interests in local broadcast television is the national television ownership 
rule.27  The rule strives to promote the FCC’s interests in viewpoint diversity 
and localism by limiting the share of the national audience any firm may 
reach.28  Unlike other broadcast ownership regulations, which are regularly 
 
 22. See Local TV News Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/06/Pew-Research-
Center_State-of-the-News-Media-2018_06-25-2019-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C8N-FDAF] 
(explaining that 2017 broadcast revenues were down 13 percent compared to 2016, an election 
year). 
 23. Local TV News Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 13, 2021), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/local-tv-news/ [https://perma.cc/A4ZP-
B26G].  A more limited data set from the second quarter of 2020 found that the median 
advertising revenues of local television news companies operating over 600 stations across 
the country were down 24 percent year over year, while retransmission revenues were up 37 
percent. Michael Barthel et al., Coronavirus-Driven Downturn Hits Newspapers Hard as TV 
News Thrives, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.journalism.org/2020/10/29/ 
coronavirus-driven-downturn-hits-newspapers-hard-as-tv-news-thrives/ [https://perma.cc/ 
95U6-FGCB] (defining “retransmission fees” as the fees cable providers pay to carry local 
news stations in their home markets).  As data becomes available over the next few nonelection 
years, the longevity of the success the medium enjoyed in 2020 will be revealed. 
 24. See SCHERER, supra note 16, at 6 (“As traditional broadcast television stations, radio 
stations, and newspapers face competition for consumers’ attention and advertising revenue, 
all three industries have consolidated.”). 
 25. See generally Gregory J. Martin & Joshua McCrain, Local News and National 
Politics, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 2372 (2019).  Cf. UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS., STIGLER 
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL 
PLATFORMS:  FINAL REPORT 271 (2019) [hereinafter Stigler Report] (“[P]latform 
monopolization removes the accountability afforded by competition”). 
 26. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 27. The FCC regulates interstate and international communications by radio, television, 
wire, and cable. About the FCC, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview [https://perma.cc/LX88-8KSQ] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2020). 
 28. Under this rule, no individual firm may reach more than 39 percent of the national 
audience. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2020). 
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reviewed by the FCC every four years, this rule is uniquely excluded by law 
from such review.29  This insulation means both that reconsideration of the 
rule’s ongoing relevance and alignment with the FCC’s guiding principles is 
far from guaranteed and that any such reconsideration would occur in 
isolation from the review of the other broadcast regulations.30  Removing the 
statutory audience cap and reinstating the review requirement would ensure 
that this regulation is regularly considered and modified as the public interest 
so requires.31 
Part I of this Note details the role local broadcast television plays in the 
current media landscape.  This part also outlines the FCC’s role and goals in 
regulating the industry.  This part then briefly presents an overview of the 
relevant areas of First Amendment, antitrust, and administrative law.  Part II 
considers the tension between First Amendment guarantees and the role that 
government oversight of media ownership plays in protecting those 
freedoms.  This part’s consideration of those conflicting ideas closely 
examines the issue of political polarization in the local press.  This part 
further analyzes these ideas’ application to local broadcast television by 
considering ownership regulations in other sectors of the media industry and 
examining the role that antitrust law plays in media ownership transactions.32  
Part III recommends revising the national television ownership rule and 
challenging the rule’s exclusion from the FCC’s quadrennial review.  This 
part asserts such revision and review is warranted by the industry’s continued 
consolidation and the connection between concentrated ownership and 
polarization.  Finally, this part outlines the strengths and limitations of other 
mitigating measures that may be implemented to address concerns regarding 
consolidated ownership. 
I.  BROADCAST MEDIA TODAY 
This part presents an overview of the current media landscape and the 
FCC’s role in regulating it.  Then, this part details two of the principal policy 
concerns the FCC considers in its regulations:  diversity and localism.  
Finally, this part outlines the relevant aspects of First Amendment, antitrust, 
 
 29. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 
111–12 (mandating regular review of media ownership rules), as amended by the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629(3), 118 Stat. 3, 100 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note) (replacing biennial review with quadrennial review and 
excluding the national television ownership rule from regular review). 
 30. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 3661, 3661 (Jan. 26, 
2018) (initiating a “comprehensive review” of the regulation, including the UHF discount); 
see also Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 397 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
FCC may decide “the scope of its authority to modify or eliminate the UHF discount outside 
the context of § 202(h)”); cf. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1156 (2021) 
(“Section 202(h) establishes an iterative process that requires the FCC to keep pace with 
industry developments and to regularly reassess how its rules function in the marketplace.”). 
 31. See supra note 29; see also FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, FED. COMMC’NS 
COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-review-broadcast-ownership-rules 
[https://perma.cc/M56A-RH2V] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 32. See infra Part I.B.1. 
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and administrative law.  A closer analysis of these areas of the law reveals 
the impact media regulation has on the democratic society.33 
A.  Current Media Landscape 
Today, viewers can access information through a range of sources, 
including broadcast and cable television, satellite and AM/FM radio, print 
publications, and social and digital media.  While American viewers and 
voters can obtain information from many sources, this Note focuses on 
broadcast television specifically. 
1.  The Importance of Local Broadcast Television 
In the saturated market for information, local news outlets are particularly 
important.  As an initial, general matter, local news outlets serve the critical 
democratic role of providing constituents with information about their local 
governments, during both election and nonelection years.34  While national 
news stories may appear in other sources, local news is generally limited to 
its area of applicability, and it often does not reach national or international 
platforms absent extraordinary circumstances.35  The democratic importance 
of local television news is also connected to its availability; viewers can 
access local news without a cable subscription.36 
Next, considering consumers’ perception of different media sources, local 
television news ranks as one of the sources people trust and prefer most.37  In 
fact, according to a “nationally representative” study Pew conducted in late 
2018, 41 percent of Americans indicated that they most prefer to learn their 
local news through television broadcasts, while 37 percent turned to online 
sources, 13 percent turned to print sources, and only 8 percent relied on 
radio.38  Looking at viewer preferences based on media type, the same study 
found that “television-oriented local news consumers” may be more attached 
 
 33. Bazelon, supra note 14 (“An information war may seem to be about speech.  But 
[German intellectual Hannah] Arendt understood that what was at stake was far more.”); see 
also Hendrickson, supra note 5 (“While a constitutional and public commitment to a free press 
on its own will not ensure the future economic viability of local news, public intervention can 
help sustain and support strong, independent media for every community in the U.S.”). 
 34. See Americans Embrace Digital, supra note 17. 
 35. Reviewing the homepage stories on sources like The New York Times, Financial 
Times, and BBC supports this proposition. 
 36. See supra note 18.  This survey also found that 38 percent of U.S. adults often get 
their local news from a local television station and that 76 percent of Americans who learn 
about local news via local television do so by watching the television station rather than by 
accessing the information via other means.  Id. 
 37. Kolhatkar, supra note 10; see also Local TV News Fact Sheet, supra note 23; 
SCHERER, supra note 16, at 5–6. 
 38. Americans Embrace Digital, supra note 17; see also JESSICA MAHONE ET AL., WHO’S 
PRODUCING LOCAL JOURNALISM?:  ACCESSING JOURNALISTIC OUTPUT ACROSS DIFFERENT 
OUTLET TYPES 4 (2019) (“Even in communities where local newspapers are available, 
resources were cut to a point where there was minimal local coverage—a situation that 
researchers have described as ‘news deserts.’”). 
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to local news than news consumers who have digital preferences.39  
Accordingly, many local news consumers not only turn first to local 
television news but also exhibit a degree of loyalty to the medium.40  
Similarly, a study conducted by the Knight Foundation and Gallup in 2019 
found more broadly that American viewers trust local news organizations 
more than they trust national news organizations.41 
Looking next to content, viewers have high expectations of objectivity in 
local news coverage.42  The Knight Foundation and Gallup study found that 
local journalists, when compared to national journalists, were viewed as 
being more “caring, trustworthy, accurate and unbiased.”43  The 2018 Pew 
study found that a majority of viewers—61 percent—believe that “local 
journalists should not share their views” in their coverage of local issues.44  
In addition to holding these standards, viewers reported generally trusting the 
information conveyed in local news programming.45  For instance, an April 
2020 Pew study, focused on news coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
found that 46 percent of U.S. adults cited local news as an important source 
for pandemic-related information.46  Moreover, results from a June 2020 Pew 
survey demonstrated that half of U.S. adults believed that their local news 
media, in covering the COVID-19 pandemic, “g[o]t the facts right . . . almost 
all or most of the time.”47 
The Pew studies demonstrate that local broadcast television is an important 
medium by which people receive their local news, particularly in the context 
of the contemporary media landscape48 and in the current sociopolitical 
moment.49  The studies also indicate that digital media and cable news have 
 
 39. Americans Embrace Digital, supra note 17 (finding that “U.S. adults who prefer 
getting local news online are less likely to follow local news very closely”). 
 40. Id.  This conclusion is drawn from the distinction between “television-oriented” 
consumers and consumers who have digital preferences.  A consumer’s orientation toward 
television implies less orientation toward—and less reliance on—digital sources. 
 41. KNIGHT FOUND. & GALLUP, STATE OF PUBLIC TRUST IN LOCAL NEWS 12 (2019), 
https://kf-site-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/000/000/440/original/ 
State_of_Public_Trust_in_Local_Media_final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/E35B-RHNK]; see also 
id. at 23 (showing that 66 percent of surveyed individuals trusted local sources to report the 
news without bias, 64 percent trusted local sources to distinguish journalism from 
commentary, and 59 percent trusted local sources to “[g]et the facts right”). 
 42. Americans Embrace Digital, supra note 17. 
 43. KNIGHT FOUND. & GALLUP, supra note 41, at 21. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Elisa Shearer, Local News Is Playing an Important Role for Americans During 
COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 2, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/07/02/local-news-is-playing-an-important-role-for-americans-during-covid-19-
outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/3ZT8-473P]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See What Are the Local News Dynamics in Your City?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 26, 
2019), https://www.journalism.org/interactives/local-news-habits/38300/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5DGC-S68C] (providing interactive statistics regarding local news consumption). 
 49. The financial struggles of local news organizations, including radio and print outlets, 
are particularly dangerous during a public health crisis because “highly localized” information 
is what the public needs most.  See Steven Waldman & Charles Sennott, The Coronavirus Is 
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not entirely supplanted local broadcast news.50  Finally, the Pew studies 
suggest that many viewers expect local journalists to accurately and 
objectively portray information.51  The Knight Foundation and Gallup study 
supports the related conclusion that local news is an important source of 
objectively conveyed information.  Because local television news is a leading 
means by which people consume local news, these studies collectively 
emphasize the importance of local television news, specifically. 
While local television news serves a critical role, many viewers who rely 
on the medium may not fully appreciate the financial realities local broadcast 
stations face today or the effect financial pressures may have on the 
industry’s organization.52  Media conglomerates’ financial positioning and 
size create a significant divide in relative bargaining power—in areas 
including advertising and capital investments53—between purely local firms 
and larger, better-resourced organizations.54  Considering larger firms’ 
positioning, potential acquisitions are presumably attractive to both small 
firms seeking acquisition and large firms seeking to acquire other firms or 
portions thereof.  For instance, after an acquisition, a smaller firm can enjoy 
the increased stability and resources of a larger firm,55 while larger firms can 
expand their reach and influence in communities across the nation by 
acquiring stations that expand their geographic footprints. 
2.  Consolidated Ownership Today 
Over time, the number of firms that own broadcast television outlets has 
decreased as the media industry has undergone significant consolidation.56  
Today, a few companies have “outsized influence,”57 which has reshaped a 
media industry formerly based on “high-quality independent news 
ownership.”58  Key firms that own and operate many of the local broadcast 
television stations today include:  Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. (“Sinclair”); 
Tegna, Inc. (“Tegna”); Nexstar Media Group (“Nexstar”); Gray Television 
 
Killing Local News, ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
2020/03/coronavirus-killing-local-news/608695/ [https://perma.cc/LXR4-FET2]. 
 50. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 51. See text accompanying supra note 44. 
 52. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Cecilia Kang et al., How a Conservative TV Giant Is Ridding Itself of Regulation, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/politics/how-a-
conservative-tv-giant-is-ridding-itself-of-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/7SYA-RLZG] 
(“Loosened regulatory requirements, Sinclair executives said, will help even the playing field 
and benefit millions of Americans who rely on broadcast stations for news and entertainment 
by allowing the companies to invest in new equipment and technology.”). 
 54. See DANA A. SCHERER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44892, SINCLAIR BROADCAST GROUP 
ACQUISITION OF TRIBUNE MEDIA:  COMPETITIVE AND REGULATORY ISSUES 2 (2017) 
(recognizing that a firm that owns many stations has increased bargaining power in advertising 
and obtaining rights to programming); SCHERER, supra note 16, at 8–9. 
 55. See Kang et al., supra note 53; see also SCHERER, supra note 54, at 2. 
 56. Kang et al., supra note 53. 
 57. Id. (quoting Lewis A. Friedland, a professor of journalism at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison). 
 58. Id. 
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(“Gray”); and the E.W. Scripps Company (“Scripps”).59  Collectively, these 
firms own and operate over 60060 of the 1373 licensed commercial broadcast 
television stations in the United States.61 
The number of markets these firms reach further emphasizes the current 
level of consolidation.  As of September 2021, there are 210 designated 
market areas (DMAs) in the United States.62  DMAs are standardized 
multicounty regions that are synonymous with a television station’s home 
market.63  Sinclair owns and operates 185 stations in eighty-six markets  
(41 percent of DMAs).64  Tegna owns and operates sixty-four local news 
brands in fifty-one markets (24 percent of DMAs).65  Nexstar, which 
acquired Tribune in September 2019,66 owns and operates 199 stations, 
including partner stations, in 116 markets (55 percent of DMAs).67  At the 
time of writing, Gray is expected to serve 113 markets (54 percent of DMAs), 
pending the closing of the anticipated acquisition of additional television 
stations.68  And, Scripps owns and operates sixty-one stations in forty-one 
markets (20 percent of DMAs).69  Though some of these companies own 
competing stations in the same DMA,70 the number of markets these firms 
reach individually and collectively71 demonstrates their significance in the 
 
 59. See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Barthel et al., supra note 23. 
 61. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Broadcast Station Totals as of June 30, 2021 (July 12, 
2021).  The 1373 figure is the sum of the number of Ultra High Frequency and Very High 
Frequency commercial broadcast television stations. See id. 
 62. DMA Regions, NIELSEN, https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/intl-campaigns/dma-maps/ 
[https://perma.cc/R5FW-8EQ8] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 63. Id. 
 64. About, SINCLAIR BROAD. GRP., https://sbgi.net [https://perma.cc/R48V-VXWV]  
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 65. About, TEGNA, https://www.tegna.com/about/trustworthy-impactful-journalism/ 
[https://perma.cc/HZX2-6S5E] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (stating the firm’s national 
audience reach is 39 percent). 
 66. See Press Release, Nexstar Media Grp., Inc., Nexstar Media Group Completes 
Tribune Media Acquisition Creating the Nation’s Largest Local Television Broadcaster  
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nexstar.tv/nexstar_completes_tribune_transaction_2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/FP43-BPMT]. 
 67. NEXSTAR MEDIA GRP., https://www.nexstar.tv [https://perma.cc/534K-5FFD]  
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (stating the firm’s national audience reach, before the UHF 
discount, is more than 68 percent). 
 68. GRAY TELEVISION, https://gray.tv [https://perma.cc/HQS9-CXFV] (last visited Oct. 
10, 2021) (stating the firm’s expected national audience reach is 36 percent). 
 69. Local Media, E.W. SCRIPPS CO., https://scripps.com/our-brands/local-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/XL8A-HRE9] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 70. For example, in the Cincinnati, Ohio, DMA, Sinclair owns CBS affiliate WKRC. See 
TV Channels, SINCLAIR BROAD. GRP., https://sbgi.net/tv-channels/ [https://perma.cc/43RK-
VWE2] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).  In the same DMA, Scripps owns ABC affiliate WCPO. 
Local Media, E.W. SCRIPPS CO., https://scripps.com/our-brands/local-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/XL8A-HRE9] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 71. The total number of stations Gray operates is not defined.  However, an October 2020 
Pew Research Center study indicated that Gray, Nexstar, Scripps, Sinclair, and Tegna together 
own or operate at least 600 stations. See Barthel et al., supra note 23.  Though the comparison 
is not perfect, 600 stations is over 40% of the total number of stations licensed in 2021. See 
supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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broadcast television industry.  FCC regulations permitting, and in some sense 
supporting, consolidation have enabled these companies to develop their 
national portfolios.72 
3.  The Federal Communications Commission 
The FCC’s rules on media ownership regulate how many stations a firm 
can own based on the number of viewers the firm reaches through those 
stations73 or the extent of the company’s total media ownership interests in a 
particular market.74  A closer look at the FCC and its guiding principles of 
diversity and localism suggests that the current level of consolidation in local 
broadcast television may at least be beginning to run counter to those 
principles.75 
In the Communications Act of 1934,76 Congress established the FCC to 
regulate communications and ensure that information is made available to 
people throughout the United States.77  Through this delegation of power, the 
FCC has authority to regulate radio and wire communication.78  While this 
Note focuses on broadcast television, the scope of the FCC’s authority is 
important.  The delegation to the FCC of authority over cable,79 broadband 
data,80 and new communications technologies81 demonstrates the total 
influence the FCC has on the dissemination of information to the American 
people. 
 
 72. See Stephen Labaton, Plan to Loosen Network Rules Goes to F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES  
(May 13, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/13/business/plan-to-loosen-network-
rules-goes-to-fcc.html [https://perma.cc/LTR3-FS7X] (discussing the relationship between 
the television ownership cap and consolidation prior to the passage of the legislation that 
ultimately established the current cap); Jon Reid, Can One Voice Dominate TV and Radio?:  
FCC Owner Rules Explained, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 4, 2021, 5:01 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/can-one-voice-dominate-tv-and-
radio-fcc-owner-rules-explained [https://perma.cc/N42N-KC6C] (explaining that the 
reinstatement of the UHF discount enabled Nexstar to acquire Tribune without exceeding the 
national cap). 
 73. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (2020). 
 74. See id. § 73.3555(a)–(b). 
 75. See infra Parts I.A.4, II.A. 
 76. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.). 
 77. See 47 U.S.C. § 151; see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 198 
(1943) (“The Commission’s duty under the Communications Act of 1934 . . . is not only to 
see that the public receives the advantages and benefits of chain broadcasting, but also . . . to 
see that practices which adversely affect the ability of licensees to operate in the public interest 
are eliminated.”). 
 78. See 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
 79. See id. § 521. 
 80. See, e.g., id. § 642. 
 81. See id. § 157 (indicating that “[t]he Commission shall determine whether any new 
technology or service proposed . . . is in the public interest” and that “encourag[ing] the 
provision of new technologies” is a policy). 
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In 1996, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 199682 to 
promote competition in the communications industry.83  The legislation 
endeavored to limit government involvement in the market for 
communications to only those rules necessary in the public interest.84  
Notwithstanding the arguably deregulatory undertones of this approach, yet 
in light of technological developments, the FCC has maintained and 
continued to modify rules guided by the general principle that the 
“diversification of mass media ownership” best serves the “public interest.”85 
4.  Viewpoint Diversity and Localism 
While the definition of the “public interest” the FCC’s rules seek to 
promote has remained elusive,86 a “central, animating assumption” 
underlying the agency’s regulation of media ownership is the belief that 
consolidated ownership “reduces viewpoint diversity,”87 a measure that 
refers to the availability of media conveying different perspectives and 
approaches to content.88  Based on this assumption, limiting consolidated 
ownership would serve to promote “substantive viewpoint diversity,” which, 
in theory, would advance “broad democratic goals,” such as enabling citizens 
to become informed, engage in deliberation, and hold government actors 
accountable.89  The argument that diversity advances these democratic goals 
is broadly based on the belief that “true democracy” requires “a vibrant, free, 
and plural media industry” that includes a wide range of viewpoints for 
individuals to consider.90  Despite challenges in measuring viewpoint 
diversity,91 courts and the FCC have demanded “empirical evidence” tending 
to show that consolidated ownership affects viewpoint diversity;  yet, 
simplifications necessarily inhere in any diversity calculation.92 
 
 82. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.). 
 83. Telecommunications Act of 1996, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/ 
general/telecommunications-act-1996 [https://perma.cc/K2NJ-5FR5] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021). 
 84. See Dietz, supra note 81, § 3. 
 85. Id. § 2. 
 86. Jack Karsten, 90 Years Later, the Broadcast Public Interest Standard Remains 
Ill-Defined, BROOKINGS (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/03/ 
23/90-years-later-the-broadcast-public-interest-standard-remains-ill-defined/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JZ8-E6J4]; see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 
(1943) (“The ‘public interest’ to be served under the Communications Act is thus the interest 
of the listening public in ‘the larger and more effective use of radio.’” (quoting 
Communications Act of 1934 § 303(g))). 
 87. Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 787–88. 
 88. See id. at 792. 
 89. Id. at 788. 
 90. Stigler Report, supra note 25, at 10; see also Kang et al., supra note 53  (“[D]emocracy 
depends on a diversity of voices and competition of news outlets.” (quoting Representative 
Frank Pallone Jr. of New Jersey)). 
 91. Researchers have reviewed viewpoint diversity in many ways. See Ho & Quinn, supra 
note 1, at 800, 803, 805–06, 809.  Despite the centrality of viewpoint diversity to the FCC’s 
regulatory approach, none of the measurement methods is without defect. See id. 
 92. See id. at 790, 810. 
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In addition to advancing viewpoint diversity, the FCC seeks to promote 
localism to ensure that local news sources respond to individual 
communities’ interests93 and critical information needs.94  “Critical 
information needs” encompass the information people need to access 
educational, employment, and business opportunities; “fully participate” in 
their communities’ civic and democratic lives; and, most generally, “live safe 
and healthy lives.”95  While much of this information may be available in 
other media, the collapse of many local print publications,96 consumers’ 
preference to learn about local news via television,97 and the prevalence of 
misinformation in social and digital media98 emphasize the importance of 
localism in local broadcast television news specifically. 
Regardless of the medium through which local news is conveyed, the 
dissemination of local information is particularly important to democracy 
because the “challenge of communication participation” begins on the local 
level.99  Local media outlets are uniquely positioned to convey information 
that is of local interest.100  Rules promoting localism thus serve the public 
interest by providing local residents with “meaningful, dedicated local news 
 
 93. SCHERER, supra note 6, at 1; see also Letter from U.S. Senators to Ajit Pai, Chairman, 
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 1 (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/ 
files/884768be-697f-4f5d-882e-e33fef3589a5 [https://perma.cc/N3CP-VYMM] (recognizing 
a close connection between media ownership rules and “the heart of localism, diversity and 
competitive fairness in local broadcasting”). 
 94. LEWIS FRIEDLAND ET AL., REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE REGARDING CRITICAL 
INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, at v–vi (2012), https://transition.fcc.gov/ 
bureaus/ocbo/Final_Literature_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAM8-VHRA] (defining the 
categories of informational needs as:  1) emergencies or risks, 2) health and welfare,  
3) education, 4) transportation, 5) economic opportunities, 6) the environment, 7) civic 
information, and 8) political information). 
 95. Id. at v.  The report notes that information needs are “an evolving concept and a 
function of change in technologies, public expectations and other factors over time.” Id. at x. 
 96. See Dan Barry, The Last Reporter in Town Had One Big Question for His Rich Boss, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/us/alden-global-capital-
pottstown-mercury.html [https://perma.cc/GHA5-DHQ8]; see also Barthel et al., supra note 
23. 
 97. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Davey Alba, On Facebook, Misinformation Is More Popular Now Than in 2016, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/technology/on-
facebook-misinformation-is-more-popular-now-than-in-2016.html [https://perma.cc/TE84-
UKYY]. 
 99. FRIEDLAND ET AL., supra note 94, at xii. 
 100. See id. 
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coverage”101 in a medium they trust102 and can readily access.103  In sum, 
local information is valuable in a democratic society, and local broadcast 
television plays an important role in the dissemination of that information. 
5.  The Relevant Rules 
In furtherance of its commitment to diversity and localism, the FCC has 
broadened its body of regulations concerning media ownership.  Today, the 
FCC’s regulations include limitations on the number of radio or television 
stations a single entity can own in any radio or television market and the share 
of viewers any common owner can reach nationally via broadcast 
television.104  While cable news, digital platforms, print publications, and 
satellite and broadcast radio also distribute critical information, this Note 
focuses on local broadcast television because of the unique democratic role 
of local broadcast television.  The primary regulation this Note addresses is 
the national television ownership rule,105 which is closely connected to the 
UHF discount,106 discussed in further detail below.107 
The national television ownership rule limits the audience reach of any 
single broadcast television company to 39 percent of national viewers.108  
While the regulation does not definitively prohibit all transactions that would 
result in an audience reach exceeding the defined cap, the regulation requires 
that any firm exceeding that cap come into compliance with the cap within 
two years of the transaction by divesting itself of stations.109 
 
 101. Letter from Robert Menendez & Cory A. Booker, U.S. Senators, to Ajit Pai, 
Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 2 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/ 
imo/media/doc/FINAL%20LETTER_FCC%20Rules%20Review_1_30_19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P6Q4-EURP].  But see Letter from Ajit V. Pai, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n, to Cory Booker, U.S. Senator (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356537A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY9A-5PJE] 
(asserting that the FCC’s role is not to “second-guess” journalists’ editorial decisions but 
rather to “establish a framework that will allow local journalists and broadcasters to thrive and 
serve their communities to the best of their abilities”). 
 102. See Letter from U.S. Senators to Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 2  
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-351358A2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NFV-LLTU] (advancing Americans’ “faith in their local broadcast 
stations” as an argument for meaningful regulation). 
 103. See supra note 18; see also text accompanying supra note 36. 
 104. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2020). 
 105. Id. § 73.3555(e). 
 106. Id. § 73.3555(e)(2)(i); see FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, FED. COMMC’NS 
COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-review-broadcast-ownership-rules 
[https://perma.cc/PG83-Q7TG] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (referring to the calculation 
method described in the regulation as the “UHF Discount”). 
 107. See infra notes 110–25 and accompanying text. 
 108. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2020). 
 109. See id.  This section of the regulation does not apply when the cap is exceeded as a 
result of population growth. See id. § 73.3555(e)(3); FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-review-broadcast-
ownership-rules [https://perma.cc/3UPP-CC24] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (noting there is 
no numerical limit on the number of stations a single entity may own nationally). 
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The UHF discount is “inextricably linked” to the ownership limit because 
it is used to calculate a firm’s audience reach, which determines the firm’s 
compliance with the cap.110  In practice, the discount reduces by half the 
number of households a broadcast television station reaches.111  For example, 
a station that reaches 3000 households over “Ultra High Frequency” (UHF) 
would be regarded as reaching only 1500 households for the purposes of the 
rule’s cap.112  This calculation reflects the former technological limitations 
of the UHF signal.113  At the time of the discount’s promulgation, “Very High 
Frequency” signals supported better transmission.114  However, when 
television stations transitioned from analog systems to digital systems in 
2009, UHF stations were no longer at a technical disadvantage115 and may 
have actually been at an advantage.116  Because regulators determined that 
the technological rationale supporting the discount no longer applied, the 
FCC eliminated it in 2016.117 
However, the discount’s absence from the FCC’s regulatory framework 
was short-lived.  The FCC reinstated the discount in 2017, soon after Ajit Pai 
became the agency’s chairman.118  As an FCC commissioner in 2016, Pai 
had dissented from the agency’s decision to eliminate the discount.119  The 
reinstatement provoked significant criticism because of its timing,120 its 
reversal of deliberative agency action,121 and its apparent politicization.122  
Following pushback, a new rulemaking proceeding, seeking to determine 
whether the discount and ownership cap should be modified, began in 
December 2017.123  The rules were not modified, and the current regulations 
 
 110. National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,124, 21,125 (May 5, 
2017). 
 111. SCHERER, supra note 16, at 14. 
 112. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(2)(i) (2020). 
 113. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21,124–25. 
 114. SCHERER, supra note 16, at 14; 82 Fed. Reg. at 21,124–25. 
 115. See also Edmund Lee, Sinclair Tries to Appease F.C.C., but Its Tribune Bid Is 
Challenged, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18 
/business/media/sinclair-tribune-fcc.html [https://perma.cc/U5LL-CAPB]. 
 116. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21,125. 
 117. National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,035, 73035  
(Oct. 24, 2016).  The discount’s elimination was proposed in 2013. Amendment of Section 
73.3555(e) of the Commission’s National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 28 FCC Rcd. 
14324 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Sept. 26, 2013). 
 118. SCHERER, supra note 16, at 15. 
 119. National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,124, 21,125 (May 5, 
2017). 
 120. See Letter from U.S. Senators to Ajit Pai, supra note 102, at 1 (asserting that the 
reinstatement of the discount “has directly facilitated the largest proposed broadcast television 
merger in history, which would give one company ownership of enough stations to reach over 
70 percent of the American population”). 
 121. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,035, 73,035  
(Oct. 24, 2016) (eliminating the UHF Discount). 
 122. Margaret Harding McGill & John Hendel, How Trump’s FCC Aided Sinclair’s 
Expansion, POLITICO (Aug. 6, 2017, 7:03 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/06/ 
trump-fcc-sinclair-broadcast-expansion-241337 [https://perma.cc/NXJ2-32DJ]. 
 123. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 3661, 3661 (Jan. 26, 
2018). 
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still account for the discount.124  Moreover, the current ownership stakes of 
broadcast television companies show both that some firms’ portfolios rely on 
the discount’s survival and, more generally, that the media industry’s current 
composition has been shaped by the discount.125 
In addition to promulgating rules governing media ownership, the FCC is 
required to review broadcast regulations on a quadrennial basis to consider 
whether such rules remain “necessary in the public interest.”126  In the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004127 (CAA), however, Congress 
established the current 39-percent audience reach cap and excluded the rule 
from the agency’s regular review.128  While the legislative history reveals 
lawmakers’ frustration with the omnibus legislation’s establishment of the 
audience reach cap, the supporting documents do not explain the rule’s 
exclusion from regular review.129  Moreover, lawmakers debating the bill’s 
passage expressed concern that amending the cap was procedurally 
improper,130 particularly when the vitality of a critical information outlet was 
involved.131  One lawmaker expressed concern that even a 35-percent cap 
would be “big enough” to allow politically biased media empires to gain 
“more control over local TV news than is appropriate.”132  Noting the 
importance of ensuring that the local news media communicates a range of 
content and perspectives, many lawmakers referenced viewpoint 
diversity.133  Of the remarks referencing the national television ownership 
 
 124. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2020) (including the 39-percent cap and the UHF 
discount). 
 125. See NEXSTAR MEDIA GRP., supra note 67 (stating that the firm reaches more than 68 
percent of the national audience); Press Release, supra note 66. 
 126. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h); see also Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2004 § 629(3) (revising the timing of the review). 
 127. Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 128. See id. § 629. 
 129. See 150 CONG. REC. 263 (2004) (statement of Sen. Thomas Daschle); id. at 188–89 
(statement of Sen. Robert Byrd); id. at 196–97 (statement of Sen. John McCain); id. at 205 
(statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg); id. at 14 (statement of Sen. Daniel Akaka); id. at 20 
(statement of Sen. Thomas Daschle); 149 CONG. REC. 32,273 (2003) (statement of Sen. Robert 
Byrd); id. at 32,079 (statement of Rep. David Obey); id. at 32,084 (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers); id. at 32,091 (statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin); id. at 32,098 (statement of Rep. Pete 
Stark); id. at 31,774 (statement of Rep. David Obey). 
 130. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. 263 (2004) (statement of Sen. Thomas Daschle) (asserting 
that the audience reach cap’s inclusion in the legislation was the result of “pressure from the 
White House” and expressing concern about the precedent the action sets); id. at 197 
(statement of Sen. John McCain) (“The omnibus spending bill is not the appropriate legislative 
vehicle to undo the commission’s broadcast ownership cap.”). 
 131. See id. at 263 (statement of Sen. Thomas Daschle); id. at 264 (statement of Sen. Jon 
Corzine) (expressing concern that the revised cap aligns with neither the votes of both houses 
nor the public interest in diverse programming); id. at 276 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); 
id. at 276–77 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (“[T]his bill allows media conglomerates to 
control more of the information the public receives.”); id. at 278 (statement of Sen. Carl 
Levin). 
 132. Id. at 194 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (referring to Rupert Murdoch’s 
“conservative” outlets); id. at 205 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg) (same). 
 133. See id. at 13–14 (statement of Sen. Daniel Akaka); id. at 15 (statement of Sen. Joe 
Biden); id. at 194 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin); id. at 276 (statement of Sen. Patrick 
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rule,134 there were only cursory references to the FCC’s regular review and 
the fact that any regulations related to the 39-percent cap would be excluded 
from review.135  Because the national television ownership rule so directly 
affects a critical conduit of local news and information, the unceremonious, 
yet consequential, amendments made in the CAA are puzzling.  A statement 
by another lawmaker more directly suggested that industry interests were at 
play.136 
B.  Legal Frameworks 
To understand the importance of reviewing the national television 
ownership rule and the practicability of any changes that may stem from such 
review, an overview of a few areas of law is necessary.  First Amendment 
law and antitrust law provide important foundational context.  First 
Amendment law informs the relationship between the government and the 
media, and antitrust law provides a framework for understanding the 
dissemination of information in the context of a marketplace of ideas.  
Antitrust law also operates more directly in media consolidation, as mergers 
and acquisitions in the industry require both the FCC’s regulatory consent 
and the approval of an antitrust enforcement agency.137  Further, because the 
FCC is an agency, administrative law principles must also be considered. 
1.  First Amendment Law 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the freedom of 
expression and, in part, ensures that Congress will not make any law that 
abridges free speech or the freedom of the press.138  The guarantees protected 
by the First Amendment form “the foundation of a vibrant democracy,”139 
and these protections apply not only to individuals but also to corporations 
and other business entities,140 including television broadcast companies.  In 
regard to the media, the First Amendment guarantees that the government 
will not interfere with the press’s ability and freedom to “censure the 
Government.”141  The freedom to criticize the government is an “essential 
concept” underpinning First Amendment protections,142 and the protection 
 
Leahy); 149 CONG. REC. 32,084 (2003) (statement of statement of Rep. John Conyers); id. at 
32,091 (statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin); id. at 32,098 (statement of Rep. Pete Stark). 
 134. See supra note 129. 
 135. See 149 CONG. REC. 32,091 (2003) (statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin). 
 136. See 150 CONG. REC. 196 (2004) (statement of Sen. John McCain) (“It is no 
coincidence . . . that the 39 percent is the exact ownership percentage of Viacom and CBS.”). 
 137. See SCHERER, supra note 54, at 1. 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 139. Free Speech, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech [https://perma.cc/ 
J9D8-MCQ5] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 140. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) 
(“[S]peech does not lose its protection because of the corporate identity of the speaker.”). 
 141. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (Black, J., concurring).  But see 
Wermiel, supra note 9 (“[U]nder some extreme circumstances, especially if there were a 
genuine threat to national security, a prior restraint [on the press] might be justified.”). 
 142. Wermiel, supra note 9. 
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of a free press “has stood the test of time through vast changes in technology 
and communications,” as well as through the introduction of new “forms of 
expression” and significant shifts in “societal values.”143 
The press plays an important mediating role in society.  For example, in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,144 the Supreme Court noted that the 
media may report on proceedings to contribute to the public’s understanding 
of the way that the criminal justice system is functioning; in other words, 
media representatives may be “surrogates for the public.”145 
In Abrams v. United States,146 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in dissent, 
emphasized the importance of protecting the communication of even 
unfavorable ideas.  The Court in Abrams considered whether the defendants’ 
First Amendment rights were violated when the defendants, who had printed 
pamphlets opposing the country’s military operations, were criminally 
charged.147  The Court found that the defendants’ rights were not violated; 
the protection of defendants’ speech was lower during wartime.148  In dissent, 
Justice Holmes asserted that there is an extremely high standard that must be 
met before government intervention with expression is permissible.149  
Justice Holmes reiterated that the strength and applicability of the 
constitutional protection cannot turn on whether the content expressed is 
favorable or not.150 
Beyond emphasizing the scope and strength of the First Amendment’s 
protections, Justice Holmes’s dissent also introduced the “marketplace of 
ideas” metaphor as a central constitutional theory.151  Aligned with the 
FCC’s guiding principle of viewpoint diversity,152 First Amendment 
jurisprudence has long been viewed as striving to protect “a marketplace for 
the clash of different views and conflicting ideas.”153  Justice Holmes’s 
metaphor draws largely on ideas that John Stuart Mill presented in On 
Liberty.154  The metaphor conceptualizes public discourse as a market in 
which ideas are exchanged, and the rationale behind the metaphor’s 
 
 143. Id. (defining the freedom of the press as a “pillar of democracy”). 
 144. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 145. Id. at 573; see also Wermiel, supra note 9. 
 146. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 147. Id. at 618–19 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919)) 
(concluding that the First Amendment’s guarantees are not unqualified). 
 148. Id. at 624. 
 149. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. (“[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe . . . .”); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 
(1994) (“Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the 
utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential 
right.”). 
 151. G. Michael Parsons, Fighting for Attention:  Democracy, Free Speech, and the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2157, 2158 (2020) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 152. See supra Part 1.A.4. 
 153. Parsons, supra note 151, at 2158 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981)). 
 154. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
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construction is the belief that competitive market forces establish the “best 
test of truth”155 and that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas,”156 or an unabridged diversity of voices.157 
Mill’s “utilitarian framework” classifies the discovery of truth as an 
important societal goal, which can be achieved when individuals reach 
conclusions in an environment that includes the expression of opposing—
and even controversial—opinions.158  According to Mill’s framework, the 
majority must be prevented from silencing dissenting minorities because 
contrary opinions are integral to society’s deliberation of ideas.159  The 
marketplace of ideas metaphor is further founded on the belief that truth will 
more likely be reached if alternative views are presented persuasively to 
challenge the “prevailing” perspectives.160  Protecting speech and fostering 
more speech is thus “necessary” because it prevents “contrary opinions” from 
being stifled and promotes effective deliberation within society.161 
As media companies consolidate and the number of disparate voices 
decreases,162 the need to consider how well the media industry and relevant 
regulations align with these constitutional promises becomes increasingly 
urgent.  Demonstrating the necessity of this review, a former FCC official 
alluded to the marketplace metaphor, noting that a goal of the First 
Amendment is to ensure that people have access to the information required 
for them to make “intelligent decisions about our democracy.”163  However, 
the official concluded that the American people are reaching the point at 
which they are not able to make those decisions because such information 
gathering is, today, impracticable.164 
Though “news products” are not necessarily “immune from regulation” 
because of the First Amendment’s press protections, the integrity of the press 
is “presumptively at risk” the moment the government intervenes or 
 
 155. Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1160, 1166–67 (2015) (suggesting that Holmes’s conceptualization of a marketplace of 
ideas may have been based on the belief that “democratic political truth is determined by . . . 
the market”). 
 156. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 157. Cf. Stigler Report, supra note 25, at 316 (concluding that a lack of competition among 
digital platforms deprives the marketplace of ideas of an important regulator and finding that 
such “political effects of concentration are unlikely to ever be captured directly by the 
consumer welfare standard”); see also supra Part I.A.4. 
 158. Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom:  An Examination of John Stuart 
Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 
35, 39 (2010). 
 159. Id. at 56; see also id. at 62 (“[D]issenting opinions, regardless of whether they are 
true, partially true, or false, aid in the discovery of truth.”). 
 160. Id. at 76. 
 161. Id. at 61. 
 162. The conclusion relies on the assumption that firms centrally influence affiliates’ 
broadcasts. See infra Part II.A.1.  This assumption is valid at least for stations owned by 
Sinclair.  See Martin & McCrain, supra note 25, at 378–79, 381. 
 163. Kolhatkar, supra note 10. 
 164. Id. (framing the principles protected by the First Amendment as “the whole premise 
of self-government” (quoting former FCC official Michael Copps)); see also supra Part I.A.4. 
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encourages modification to the press’s messaging.165  Acknowledging that a 
strictly laissez-faire approach to the media could appear to circumvent all 
actual or apparent intervention, First Amendment scholars are now 
reconsidering the belief that “more speech is better.”166  This reconsideration 
has arisen in light of the current climate in which “overwhelming waves of 
speech from extremists” and “mass distortion[s] of truth” have undermined 
the foundational premise that the truth will certainly be realized in a 
marketplace of competing voices.167 
2.  Antitrust Law 
The adoption of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor as the “dominant 
lens” for free-speech analysis168 is fitting for considering the intersection of 
First Amendment protections and antitrust principles as applied to the 
media.169  The two bodies of law intersect in many ways.170  Beyond their 
overlapping development,171 First Amendment and antitrust considerations 
directly coincide in this context, as the FCC and an antitrust enforcement 
agency each review proposed media transactions.172  The FCC considers 
competitive concerns to the extent they are incorporated into the agency’s 
analysis of what serves the public interest,173 while the antitrust enforcement 
agency’s focus on competition is necessarily informed by the First 
Amendment concerns that animate the transaction’s relevant market.174  
While antitrust law in most economic sectors seeks to protect consumer 
welfare, antitrust law and regulatory oversight in the media industry may also 
be understood as seeking to protect “citizen welfare,” which measures how 
well democracy is functioning.175 
 
 165. Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 166. Bazelon, supra note 14. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Parsons, supra note 151, at 2158.  But see Candeub, supra note 3, at 1550, 1581 
(questioning the adoption of the marketplace of ideas as a guiding metaphor). 
 169. In the market of digital media platforms, specifically, “concern with monopoly and 
economic concentration has grown on the left and the right,” supporting, or at least implying, 
the universal importance of this analysis. Stigler Report, supra note 25, at 327. 
 170. Daniel Crane, Collaboration and Competition in Information and News During 
Antitrust’s Formative Era, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. UNIV. (June 29, 2020), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/collaboration-and-competition-in-information-and-news-
during-antitrusts-formative-era [https://perma.cc/EU2B-DEGD]. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 794; SCHERER, supra note 54, at 1. 
 173. See Overview of the FCC’s Review of Significant Transactions, FED. COMMC’NS 
COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/guides/review-of-significant-transactions 
[https://perma.cc/BU6M-EEEB] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); The FCC and Freedom of 
Speech, FED. COMM’CNS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fcc-and-freedom-
speech [https://perma.cc/S57D-9G55] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 174. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Requires Structural Relief 
to Resolve Antitrust Concerns in Nexstar’s Merger with Tribune (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-structural-relief-resolve-
antitrust-concerns-nexstar-s-merger [https://perma.cc/5L4K-UYEY]. 
 175. Stigler Report, supra note 25, at 9; see also id. at 315 (defining consumer welfare as 
the primary predicate for “[c]ontemporary antitrust enforcement”). 
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The main antitrust law that governs mergers and acquisitions, including 
those in the media industry, is § 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914.176  Section 7 
prohibits actions that substantially lessen competition.177  Under the Clayton 
Act of 1914, an antitrust enforcement agency considers whether a proposed 
merger will likely create or enhance market power or eliminate 
competition.178  Horizontal mergers between direct competitors are of 
particular concern.179  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) 
outline the analysis an antitrust enforcement agency follows in its review of 
a proposed merger.  Though they are not binding law, the Guidelines aid the 
agency in “identify[ing] and challeng[ing] competitively harmful 
mergers,”180 while preventing the enforcing agency from interfering 
unnecessarily with mergers that could promote competition—or at least not 
hurt it.181  In addition to considering a proposed merger’s competitive effects, 
the enforcing agency also considers whether the merger will create 
efficiencies that are contingent on the consummation of the proposed merger 
or whether the efficiencies can be achieved by less anticompetitive means.182 
In granting merger approval in the media industry, the enforcing agency 
may condition its approval on the divestiture of a certain number of 
stations.183  For example, after Sinclair’s attempt to acquire Tribune failed 
on other grounds, Nexstar sought to acquire Tribune,184 and the U.S. 
Department of Justice conditioned the approval of Nexstar’s acquisition on 
the divestiture of certain stations.185  Assistant Attorney General Makan 
Delrahim detailed the divestitures on which the granting of the merger 
approval was contingent186 and asserted that, absent the mandated 
divestitures, the consolidation would “threaten[] significant competitive 
harm to cable and satellite TV subscribers and small businesses” by 
eliminating “head-to-head competition” in certain markets and requiring 
cable and satellite providers to pay higher retransmission fees for broadcast 
content.187 
 
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 18l; see SCHERER, supra note 54, at 6. 
 177. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/LL7Y-
VTRW] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 178. Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers [https://perma.cc/K26W-ES8X] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021). 
 179. Id. 
 180. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUST., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 & n.2 
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergers/100819hmg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EQ8W-CTNT]. 
 181. Id.  Mergers that will lessen competition are cause for concern. Id. at 2–5. 
 182. Id. at 29–30 (conceding that projected efficiencies may not actually materialize). 
 183. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 174. 
 184. David Shepardson, FCC Approves Nexstar Media Deal to Buy Tribune Media, 
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tribune-media-m-a-
nexstar-media/fcc-approves-nexstar-media-deal-to-buy-tribune-media-idUSKBN1W1276 
[https://perma.cc/SH5T-NAD2]. 
 185. See Press Release, supra note 174. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id. 
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While the FCC adheres to quantitative limitations on ownership to regulate 
communications, the antitrust enforcement agency’s analysis of the same 
merger looks at a broader range of competitive concerns more closely related 
to the businesses supporting the media firms involved.188  The fact that the 
FCC and the enforcing agency approach the same transactions with different 
guiding frameworks does not necessarily mean that their analyses are 
unrelated or that the FCC’s regulations do not influence the determinations 
the enforcing agency makes.189  To some extent, the threshold limitations 
established by the FCC likely inform the enforcing agency’s analysis of the 
degree to which consolidation in the relevant sector would interfere with 
competition or cause harm, while the FCC’s framework also considers 
whether a transaction may increase competition.190 
The FCC may consider the extent to which licensees seeking renewal 
maintain or advance anticompetitive practices; however, the FCC is not 
conclusively directed by a firm’s compliance with antitrust laws.191  
Operating within its delegated authority192 requires the FCC to refrain from 
concerning itself too directly with the business activities of broadcast 
firms.193  Yet, considering antitrust principles in the context of the media has 
raised the question of whether the First Amendment necessarily precludes 
the government, including antitrust enforcement agencies, from “imposing” 
on news organizations its “own vision of information freedom.”194  
Moreover, the extent to which otherwise anticompetitive arrangements affect 
the creation and dissemination of news information195 demonstrates that the 
two bodies of law—First Amendment and antitrust—can be in conflict.196  
Under the former, government involvement is viewed with scrutiny.  Under 
the latter, government involvement may be mandated. 
Importantly, the FCC’s broadcast media regulations are not actually 
antitrust immunity provisions.  Unlike other antitrust principles—such as the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes from antitrust liability actions 
constituting government petitioning197—the FCC’s broadcast regulations 
 
 188. SCHERER, supra note 54, at 6. 
 189. See id. at 6–7. 
 190. See id. at 9. 
 191. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943). 
 192. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 193. See Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 232 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the 
regulation of radio broadcasting firms may be necessary for the furtherance of the public 
interest but disagreeing that certain regulations fall within the agency’s delegation of power). 
 194. Crane, supra note 170. 
 195. See The Daily:  Taking Over Local News, N.Y. TIMES, at 9:40–11:00, 12:35–14:05 
(Apr. 6, 2018) (accessed online), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/business/media/ 
sinclair-news-anchors-script.html [https://perma.cc/WJ9U-7ZGZ] (discussing the operational 
changes, including production centralization, that occurred after a station was acquired by 
Sinclair). 
 196. See Crane, supra note 170 (“[A]n exclusive legal right to a news story may prevent its 
broad dissemination and hence limit the right of others to speak and to compete, but also 
enable the creation of the story in the first place.”). 
 197. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON 
DOCTRINE 3–4 (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ftc-staff-
2021] MEDIA CONSOLIDATION & POLITICAL POLARIZATION  931 
simply establish thresholds of consolidation that have been deemed 
permissible.198  The regulations do not, however, guarantee a merger’s 
approval.199 
3.  Administrative Law 
Finally, general principles of administrative law are worth mentioning, as 
the degree of permissible intervention by the FCC is defined by the scope of 
authority delegated to the agency by Congress.  As noted in the overview of 
the current media landscape, Congress initially delegated certain powers to 
the FCC in the Communications Act of 1934.  This delegation of power was 
constitutionally founded in Congress’s authority to regulate “interstate and 
foreign commerce.”200  A court’s review of the legality of the FCC’s 
rulemaking is deferential, and judicial intervention is limited to instances in 
which the agency’s action may be deemed to be arbitrary and capricious.201  
For instance, courts have reviewed under this deferential standard the 
agency’s numerical limits on local ownership202 and the extent to which 
certain regulations actually advance the policies they purport to promote.203 
II.  REGULATING THE MEDIA & PROTECTING THE PRESS 
This part details the impact FCC regulations have on the state of the press.  
First, a review of Sinclair’s attempted acquisition of Tribune illustrates the 
connection between media consolidation and political polarization.  Next, an 
overview of media regulations in various sectors outlines the policy concerns 
underlying the FCC’s regulatory approach.  Finally, the intersection of 
antitrust policy considerations in merger review with the First Amendment 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor animates the debate between calls for 
increased oversight of local media ownership and the arguments for 
continued deregulation. 
A.  Political Polarization 
Concentrated ownership has had a sizable—yet potentially 
unrecognized—impact on citizen welfare and the nation’s democratic 




 198. See supra Part I.A.5. 
 199. See supra notes 137, 178–82 and accompanying text. 
 200. 47 U.S.C. § 151; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Supreme Court has held 
that the “public interest, convenience, or necessity” criteria was specific enough to provide the 
FCC with sufficient guidance in the exercise of its delegated authority. See Nat’l Broad. Co. 
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). 
 201. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 202. See Sinclair Broad. Grp. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 203. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 204. Such welfare for viewers of conservative programming, specifically, has been further 
diminished by the “dearth of competition for factual accuracy” among right-leaning outlets. 
Bazelon, supra note 14. 
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with outsized influence in a medium that is viewed as being particularly 
trustworthy and not transparently slanted.  While the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor underlying the FCC’s focus on viewpoint diversity promotes the 
protection of all viewpoints,205 the metaphor appears to fall short when 
political biases are embedded in a medium that viewers expect or believe is 
objective206 and when the impact of misinformation and consumer 
preferences on the broader media landscape—the “marketplace”—is 
considered.207 
1.  A Case Study:  Sinclair Broadcast Group 
Sinclair’s attempted acquisition of Tribune illustrates the effect the 
national television ownership rule has on the current media landscape, while 
a study conducted following Sinclair’s acquisition of other stations warns of 
the broader implications of media consolidation.  Before Sinclair attempted 
to acquire Tribune, the firm owned 173 stations across eighty-one DMAs.208  
In building this portfolio, Sinclair used “creative” growth techniques.209  One 
such strategy involved joint sales agreements,210 which allowed the firm to 
circumvent a regulation limiting the number of top-rated channels any 
company could own in a single market.211  Sinclair also engaged in 
agreements, in which the firm sold one station to a former employee, retained 
ownership in a second, and essentially maintained control of both, even 
though the firms were formally owned separately.212  In spite of the 
seemingly evident reduction in viewpoint diversity these agreements would 
cause, Sinclair’s general counsel noted that, “to his knowledge,” the 
agreements neither harmed program diversity nor reduced competition for 
viewers.213 
In 2017, Sinclair took a similarly strategic approach when it sought to 
acquire Tribune.214  The proposed merger would have allowed Sinclair to 
 
 205. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 206. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Bazelon, supra note 14. 
 208. SCHERER, supra note 54, at 1. 
 209. Kang et al., supra note 53.  David Smith, formerly Sinclair’s president and CEO and 
now the firm’s executive chairman, “helped pioneer a workaround” to avoid the rule limiting 
local ownership caps by having relative Carolyn Smith become majority owner of the stations 
Sinclair would be required to divest, “effectively turning control of the station back to 
Sinclair.” Felix Gillette, The Sinclair Revolution Will Be Televised.  It’ll Just Have Low 
Production Values, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 20, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-07-20/the-sinclair-revolution-will-be-
televised-it-ll-just-have-low-production-values [https://perma.cc/9SN9-F3RK]. 
 210. Kang et al., supra note 53. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. The proposed transaction captured the attention of many lawmakers. See Press 
Release, U.S. Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Klobuchar, Durbin, Senators Urge Department of Justice 
and Federal Communications Commission to Closely Scrutinize Media Mergers, Particularly, 
the Proposed Sinclair Broadcasting/Tribune Media Merger (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/1/klobuchar-durbin-senators-urge-
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control 215 stations, reach more than 70 percent of viewers (before the UHF 
discount was applied),215 and enjoy “significant presence” in political swing 
states.216  Even though the national television ownership rule forbids one 
firm from reaching more than 39 percent of the national audience,217 the 
reinstated UHF discount would have allowed Sinclair to reach this significant 
share of the national audience.218  Even after the discount’s application, 
however, Sinclair would have been required to sell twenty-three stations to 
adhere to the regulation’s cap.219  Still, such divestiture was scrutinized for 
appearing to be more formal than functional,220 thereby undercutting the 
effect of the divestiture requirement and audience-reach limitations.221  The 
transaction failed on other grounds, and in May 2020, the FCC fined Sinclair 
following the agency’s investigation into Sinclair’s failure to disclose certain 
information.222 
Before the attempted acquisition, Sinclair had close ties to the Trump 
campaign and administration.223  Considering both the extent to which the 
deal had been steeped in politics and the connection between Sinclair’s 





 215. David Shepardson, Sinclair to Sell TV Stations as Part of Tribune Acquisition, 
REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tribune-media-m-a-
sinclair-ma/sinclair-to-sell-tv-stations-as-part-of-tribune-acquisition-idUSKBN1HV2RL 
[https://perma.cc/6DWH-5CNF]. 
 216. See Kang et al., supra note 53. 
 217. See 47 C.F.R. 73.3555(e) (2020). 
 218. Lee, supra note 115.  Importantly, Sinclair was not the first—and likely will not be 
the last—to exploit the discount.  Id.; see also Labaton, supra note 72 (attributing the growth 
of Viacom-owned UPN, Time-Warner-owned WB, and Fox to the UHF discount). 
 219. Edmund Lee, In Blow to Sinclair, F.C.C. Chief Says He Has ‘Serious Concerns’ with 
Tribune Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/business/ 
media/fcc-sinclair-tribune-pai.html [https://perma.cc/S4PC-Y5L7]. 
 220. While the stations would be formally divested, the stations would, in effect, still be 
subject to Sinclair control via “sidecar” agreements, which transfer the FCC license but allow 
the seller to retain control. Id. 
 221. Lee, supra note 115 (explaining that stations involved in the planned divestitures 
would “effectively remain within Sinclair’s control”); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(3) (2020) 
(requiring divestiture when an entity exceeds the audience reach cap). 
 222. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Sinclair Agrees to Pay $48 Million Civil 
Penalty (May 6, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-364198A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K6AW-M2P7]; see also Neil Vigdor & Edmund Lee, Sinclair Wanted to 
Rival Fox News.  Now It Faces a $48 Million Fine, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/business/sinclair-fine-fcc.html 
[https://perma.cc/GC7V-GQBR]. 
 223. Josh Dawsey & Hadas Gold, Kushner:  We Struck Deal with Sinclair for Straighter 
Coverage, POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2016, 5:35 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/ 
trump-campaign-sinclair-broadcasting-jared-kushner-232764 [https://perma.cc/SQF6-FPJ4]. 
 224. Boris Epshteyn, a spokesman for President Trump, became a Sinclair commentator 
after leaving the White House. See Kang et al., supra note 53.  Chairman Pai and former 
Sinclair CEO David Smith met twice after President Trump’s election and before sweeping 
deregulatory efforts, like the UHF discount’s reinstatement and the refusal to limit use of joint 
sales agreements, were introduced. See id. 
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motivations cannot guide agency decision-making was somewhat ironic.225  
In the press release announcing the historic fine, Chairman Pai expressed 
disagreement with the merger’s opponents, who had demanded that the 
agency revoke Sinclair’s licenses.226  Pai asserted that the First Amendment 
“still applies” even though opponents “don’t like what they perceive to be 
the broadcaster’s viewpoints.”227  Though the deal was never completed, the 
FCC did not expressly indicate how, if at all, the company’s political slant 
and affiliations would have weighed into the agency’s consideration of the 
proposal.228 
Relying on the same deregulatory discount, Nexstar TV ultimately 
acquired Tribune in 2019.229  While Sinclair’s attempted acquisition would 
have allowed its stations to reach 72 percent of U.S. households (before the 
UHF discount),230 Nexstar’s 2019 acquisition contributed to the firm’s 
current national audience reach of 68 percent (before the UHF discount).231  
While the difference between Sinclair’s potential reach and the reach that 
Nexstar ultimately achieved is not insignificant, Nexstar ultimately amassed 
an audience reach roughly comparable to that which Sinclair sought.  Even 
without the Tribune stations, Sinclair’s national reach remained 
significant,232 and the firm’s size makes it an apt example for considering the 
relationship between consolidation and polarization. 
2.  Consolidation & Polarization 
After Sinclair’s proposed acquisition failed, an empirical review of 
Sinclair’s business shed light on the potential impact the deal’s success could 
have had on local news throughout the country.233  As an initial matter, 
Sinclair’s coverage is generally conservative.234  While Sinclair’s “partisan 
leanings” are not “immediately apparent” because the firm operates local 
affiliates of ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC, its political orientation is woven 
throughout its affiliates’ broadcasts.235  Some of the most politically slanted 
pieces of coverage are the firm’s “must-run[]” segments.236  The segments 
 
 225. See supra note 122.  This warning may be characterized as ironic because it warns 
against politicization, and there were political undertones to the UHF discount’s reinstatement. 
See McGill & Hendel, supra note 122. 
 226. See Press Release, supra note 222. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of Chairman Ajit Pai on 
Sinclair/Tribune Transaction (July 16, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-
352619A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N82C-NSMH]. 
 229. See Press Release, supra note 66. 
 230. Sinclair and Tribune, MB Docket 17-179, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
https://www.fcc.gov/transaction/sinclair-tribune [https://perma.cc/2VZC-FLZQ] (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2021). 
 231. NEXSTAR MEDIA GROUP, supra note 67. 
 232. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 233. See generally Martin & McCrain, supra note 25. 
 234. Bazelon, supra note 14. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Kolhatkar, supra note 10. 
2021] MEDIA CONSOLIDATION & POLITICAL POLARIZATION  935 
are produced—or scripted—centrally by Sinclair’s corporate team,237 and 
local affiliates are required to run these pieces, regardless of the affiliates’ 
evaluations of the segments’ objectivity and validity.238 
A report published in the American Political Science Review studied 
transcripts of news coverage from Sinclair affiliates, both before and after 
their acquisition by the firm.239  Researchers found that after Sinclair 
acquired stations, local news coverage decreased, as national news coverage 
increased.240  Additionally, politically conservative rhetoric and language 
increased postacquisition.241  The study’s demonstration of a politically 
rightward shift indicates a relationship between Sinclair’s acquisition of 
stations and the introduction of a politically conservative slant.  This 
observation, in turn, implies that viewpoint diversity was reduced, as 
postacquisition changes to broadcast content shifted perspectives 
consistently toward more conservative views.  Based on the samples drawn 
from the Sinclair affiliates, the report broadly concluded that consolidation 
can support, and potentially fuel, mass political polarization.242 
Consolidation supports polarization by providing a firm with both a larger 
audience and the practical capacity to guarantee that the viewpoints the firm 
wishes to advance are widely shared.  A few observations of Sinclair’s model 
demonstrate these conclusions.  First, viewers of Sinclair-owned affiliates are 
not given obvious notice of the local station’s ownership.243  Viewers are 
thus unable to consume the local media with expectations of a broadcast’s 
political propensities the way they may be able to with cable news channels, 
like MSNBC or Fox.244  Second, centrally produced segments, scripts, and 
topics create content homogeneity among affiliates across the country.245  
Unlike a single local news outlet creating independent content falling short 
of viewers’ expectations of objectivity,246 Sinclair’s national scale 
guarantees that a greater number of viewers across the country will be 
exposed to such coverage.247  Finally, Sinclair’s leaders’ political leanings 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  See generally Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (@LastWeekTonight), Sinclair 
Broadcast Group:  Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (July 2, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvtNyOzGogc&t=3s [https://perma.cc/UZ88-G25K] 
(demonstrating the departure of Sinclair’s coverage from journalistic standards of objectivity). 
 239. See Martin & McCrain, supra note 25. 
 240. Id. at 373, 375, 379. 
 241. Id. at 380. 
 242. Id. at 382–83. 
 243. See About, supra note 64 (indicating that Sinclair operates stations “affiliated with all 
the major broadcast networks”). 
 244. Cf. The Daily:  Taking Over Local News, supra note 195, at 12:20–12:34 (discussing 
how the credence of trusted local newscasters may camouflage the subjectivity of must-run 
segments or scripts). 
 245. Martin & McCrain, supra note 25, at 373, 383. 
 246. See Americans Embrace Digital, supra note 17 (“A majority of Americans say local 
journalists should not share their views about local issues.”).  This belief regarding journalists’ 
sharing of their views suggests that viewers expect, or at least hope, for the medium to be 
objective.  The Knight Foundation-Gallup study suggests that many viewers believe the local 
news is, indeed, objective. See text accompanying supra note 43. 
 247. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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have ensured that slanted coverage was almost always slanted only one 
way.248  Here, it is critical to note that the concerns revealed by this study 
would be present even if the slant was toward the left.249 
Notwithstanding the caveat that any divergence from an objective lens is 
troublesome, Sinclair’s conservative slant is particularly problematic given 
the relationship between viewers’ political affiliations and their trust in the 
news media.250  A recent Gallup poll showed that most Democrats trust that 
the media is “fully, accurately, and fairly” conveying the news, while 
Republicans strongly distrust the media.251  Absent scholarship defining the 
extent to which trusting viewers, as compared to skeptical viewers, actually 
accept the information conveyed in the media, commentary252 on the impact 
of widespread misinformation and disinformation suggests that the belief that 
viewers are capable of filtering and properly situating politically biased 
coverage253 is dangerously optimistic.  Conservative coverage, which itself 
may be promoting distrust in the media, thus discourages viewers who have 
adopted such distrust from seeking out information from other sources and 
breaks down the foundational assumptions supporting the marketplace of 
ideas metaphor.254 
One of the most notorious examples of Sinclair’s must-run segments 
involved centrally drafted scripts about the danger of fake news.255  This 
illustration of Sinclair’s control of local affiliates’ scripts revealed a political 
 
 248. See Bazelon, supra note 14.  But see Martin & McCrain, supra note 25, at 382–83. 
 249. Stigler Report, supra note 25, at 21 n.41 (citing Kolhatkar, supra note 10). 
 250. See Brenan, supra note 9 (finding that, in 2020, 73 percent of Democrats trusted mass 
media a “great deal” or a “fair amount” and that, in 2019, 69 percent of Democrats trusted 
mass media a “great deal” or a “fair amount,” while finding that, in 2020, only 10 percent of 
Republicans trusted mass media a “great deal” or a “fair amount” and that, in 2019, 15 percent 
of Republicans trusted mass media a “great deal” or a “fair amount”). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Miles Parks, Fake News:  How to Spot Misinformation, NPR (Oct. 31, 2019,  
12:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/29/774541010/fake-news-is-scary-heres-how-to-
spot-misinformation [https://perma.cc/GY48-TFB9] (recommending that consumers consider 
whether content is sponsored or presented with properly contextualized evidence); Brian X. 
Chen, How to Deal With a Crisis of Misinformation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/14/technology/personaltech/how-to-deal-with-a-crisis-of-
misinformation.html [https://perma.cc/P6LV-4VCK] (recommending similar strategies). 
 253. For instance, Boris Epshteyn allegedly used must-run segments to “push the Trump 
agenda.” Adam K. Raymond, Sinclair, Conservative Local TV Giant, Cuts Pro-Trump 
Agenda, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 11, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/sinclair-giant-
cuts-pro-trump-propagandist-boris-epshteyn.html [https://perma.cc/T64C-ACLW].  Though 
his segments were removed from broadcasts, his retention at the firm indicates his influence 
may persist.  The connection between Sinclair and the Trump administration is further 
evidenced by a 2016 agreement to present increased Trump campaign coverage. Dawsey & 
Gold, supra note 223. 
 254. See Brenan, supra note 9. 
 255. See Jacey Fortin & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Sinclair Made Dozens of Local News 
Anchors Recite the Same Script, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/04/02/business/media/sinclair-news-anchors-script.html [https://perma.cc/3AAX-
U26V]; The Daily:  Taking Over Local News, supra note 195, at 12:20–12:34 (“[Y]ou’re still 
using your trusted local anchors, who do not have a bias, . . . to give credence and to give 
weight to that commentary.”). 
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agenda256 that threatened the democratic role of the local media.257  
Moreover, the sheer number of stations that aired their trusted local anchors 
reading the script emphasized Sinclair’s national reach258 and the ease with 
which a consolidated firm can introduce biased coverage into households 
across the nation. 
Beyond local television news, the consolidation of firms in the digital 
space has had a discernable and dangerous impact on political 
polarization.259  The reckoning of free speech and regulatory concerns in the 
digital space can easily overshadow the urgency and stakes of what was 
narrowly avoided when Sinclair’s attempted acquisition failed.260  While 
other information sources, such as the internet, raise critical concerns of their 
own, both the importance of local television news to communities and 
people’s trust in their local anchors suggest that a review of one of the 
primary rules regulating broadcast television ownership is no less urgent.  
Though one empirical study of one media firm’s impact on its affiliates may 
not be sufficient to support a complete rewriting of the relevant rules, the 
findings should at least indicate the necessity of closer review.  That the FCC 
already convenes regularly to review other broadcast media regulations 
further supports this position.  While introducing increased government 
oversight of an aspect of the media raises First Amendment concerns, as the 
following section shows, government regulation of the media does not 
inherently contravene First Amendment guarantees. 
B.  Regulating the Media 
Regulations of newspapers and broadcast radio and television have been 
upheld against constitutional challenges.  These decisions show that the 
constitutional guarantee of a free press does not preclude governmental 
oversight of the media.  Courts have found varying degrees of regulation of 
certain media forms to be constitutionally permissible based on the nature of 
the medium concerned.261  Accordingly, the existence of regulatory 
 
 256. For example, President Trump was “a protected figure on Sinclair airwaves,” and the 
company’s stations had “adopted Trump’s tactic” of attacking competitors’ production of 
“fake news.” Gillette, supra note 209. 
 257. While must-run segments are unique to Sinclair, a firm’s ability to direct or influence 
affiliates’ local programming still calls into question the extent to which stations are serving 
their local communities. See The Daily:  Taking Over Local News, supra note 195, at 10:00, 
12:35. 
 258. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 259. Stigler Report, supra note 25, at 277. 
 260. See notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 261. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“We have long 
recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.”); 
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression, of 
course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may 
present its own problems.”); see also Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) 
(“[S]ome of our cases have recognized special justifications for regulation of the broadcast 
media that are not applicable to other speakers.”); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748 (explaining 
that the broadcast medium has enjoyed the “most limited First Amendment protection” 
because of its “uniquely pervasive presence” and “unique[] accessib[ility] to children”); Red 
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intervention or oversight in other areas of the media industry does not suggest 
that the level of oversight in one area necessarily carries over—or applies—
to another.  Yet, courts’ reasoning in decisions upholding media regulations 
demonstrates how regulation can comply with the First Amendment and how 
deregulation may be its own form of interference with press freedoms. 
When the New Deal was implemented in the 1930s, an “anti-Bigness” 
perspective served as the “prevailing” antitrust ideology.262  At the time, the 
U.S. Department of Justice initiated antitrust suits against dominant 
newspapers based on the belief that those newspapers harmed consumers by 
raising prices.263  These suits were further based on the belief that the 
competitive disruption these dominant firms imposed fundamentally 
interfered with the functioning of the free press and the marketplace of 
ideas.264 
In Associated Press v. United States,265 for example, the Supreme Court 
held that Associated Press (AP) newspapers could not prevent local 
competitors from becoming AP members.266  The Court rejected the 
argument that regulating newspapers in this way violated the freedom of the 
press and further insisted that antitrust jurisprudence in media could not be 
adjudged by an industry-specific standard.267  The Court noted that, while 
the Constitution guaranteed the freedom to publish, such guarantee did not 
include the freedom to combine to keep others from publishing.268  Though 
Justice Owen Roberts warned in dissent that establishing a decree that sought 
to prevent future antitrust injury in newspaper publishing could threaten the 
press’s freedom,269 this early case demonstrated that oversight—including 
enforcement under antitrust law—and press freedoms were not mutually 
exclusive.270 
The Court has also held that regulation of broadcast radio does not 
necessarily violate the First Amendment.271  In National Broadcasting Co. v. 
United States,272 the Court held that the FCC’s denial of a radio station 
license did not violate the applicant stations’ constitutional rights because 
 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969) (finding more involved regulation of 
the broadcast medium constitutional “[i]n view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies”). 
 262. Crane, supra note 170. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 266. See id. at 9. 
 267. Id. at 20; see also id. at 7 (“Members of [the AP] are engaged in business for profit 
exactly as are other business men who sell food, steel, aluminum, or anything else people need 
or want.”). 
 268. Id. at 20. 
 269. Id. at 48 (Roberts, J., dissenting in part). 
 270. Id. at 20 (majority opinion). 
 271. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).  But see FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (finding that First Amendment protection “might 
be required” if the FCC’s prohibition on allegedly offensive content “could be traced to its 
political content”). 
 272. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
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Congress, through the Communications Act of 1934,273 authorized and 
empowered the FCC to manage the distribution of broadcast rights to serve 
the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”274  Further, the Court 
reasoned that the Constitution does not guarantee “the right to use the 
facilities of radio without a license.”275 
While the Court’s analysis was focused on freedom of speech in the 
context of limited licenses, the broader implications of the Court’s holding 
on the government’s ability to control access to a vehicle of communication 
suggest that press freedoms did not necessarily remain unaffected, since 
radio facilities, like broadcast television stations, also serve as conduits for 
the dissemination news and information.  Moreover, the Court’s introduction 
of the efficiencies that broadcasting agreements with networks may create 
alluded to economic considerations.  Though the Court’s holding was limited 
to First Amendment concerns, the Court’s acknowledgement of economic 
efficiencies points to the interconnectedness of the constitutional and 
antitrust questions raised by regulation of the media. 
Regulations affecting viewpoint were then addressed directly in Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.276  There, the Supreme Court confronted 
constitutional and statutory challenges to the fairness doctrine and 
maintained that there is a public interest in viewpoint diversity.277  The 
fairness doctrine required broadcasters to present “discussion of public 
issues” and create opportunity for opposing perspectives on those issues to 
be given “fair coverage.”278  The Court concluded that the doctrine complied 
with the First Amendment’s protections, reasoning that a broadcaster’s 
freedom to speak and publish “does not embrace a right to snuff out” others’ 
rights to the same.279  The doctrine upheld in Red Lion suggests that all 
measures affecting content do not necessarily infringe the freedoms that the 
First Amendment guarantees.280  Further, the Court’s holding again 
demonstrated the interconnectedness of First Amendment protections and the 
competitive concerns central to antitrust law.281 
In television specifically, the Seventh Circuit grappled with the balance 
between promoting competition and protecting the vitality of the marketplace 
of ideas.  In Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC,282 Judge Richard Posner 
questioned whether the FCC’s position that supporting independent stations 
through syndication would lead to increased diversity in programming within 
 
 273. 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
 274. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 225. 
 275. Id. at 227. 
 276. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 277. Id. at 380, 385. 
 278. Id. at 382.  In practice, this means that if a broadcaster grants a political candidate 
coverage, the broadcaster must grant at least equal time to the candidate’s opponent. See id. at 
385. 
 279. Id. at 387 (reaching this conclusion on the ground that broadcast signals reach further 
than an individual’s voice). 
 280. See id. at 394. 
 281. See id. at 400–01. 
 282. 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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any particular market.283  Judge Posner’s analysis asserted that consolidated 
ownership may actually promote diversity by making more feasible the 
simultaneous broadcast of different types of programs within a given 
market.284 
Two years after Schurz, the Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC285 considered more directly whether government 
oversight of television complied with the First Amendment’s protections.  At 
issue in Turner was a law requiring cable operators to designate a certain 
share of their transmission capacity to broadcasters that requested carriage 
by cable.286  In drafting the law, Congress determined that horizontal and 
vertical concentration in the cable industry had foreclosed broadcasters, 
created barriers to entry for new programmers, and reduced the number and 
variety of voices available to consumers.287  Importantly, the Court 
determined that these rules imposed by the law were content-neutral because 
the interference with cable operators’ decisions on the allocation of 
transmission capacity was not based on programming content.288  That such 
designation necessarily limited the transmission capacity cable providers 
could allocate for content of their choice did not alter the Court’s 
determination.289  Further, the Court cited the importance of guaranteeing the 
survival of free broadcast television, which had by then become a “vital” 
medium in American communications.290 
Though Turner was centrally concerned with a measure applied to cable 
television providers, the policies underlying the Court’s decision 
demonstrate that the growing influence and prominence of cable 
communications did not eliminate the public interest in broadcast 
television.291  The Court’s distinction between content-based and 
content-neutral measures is also important to understanding the 
constitutional limits of broadcast television regulations.292  Just as the Turner 
Court found that measures that were not based on content but that may affect 
content were content-neutral, so too may a modified national television 
ownership rule be classified as content-neutral.293  While a revised version 
of the rule may ultimately affect the content broadcast on local television 
 
 283. Id. at 1054 (“If all the television channels in a particular market were owned by a 
single firm, its optimal programming strategy would be to put on a sufficiently varied menu 
of programs in each time slot to appeal to every substantial group of potential television 
viewers in the market, not just the largest group.”). 
 284. Id. 
 285. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 286. Id. at 630. 
 287. Id. at 634. 
 288. Id. at 643–45 (noting that, generally, laws are content-based when they differentiate 
favored and disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas expressed).  But see id. at 645 
(specifying that facially neutral measures may be content-based if the “manifest purpose is to 
regulate speech because of the message it conveys”). 
 289. Id. at 649–50. 
 290. Id. at 647. 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. at 645. 
 293. See id. at 643. 
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stations, modifications seeking to limit increased consolidation and guard 
against politically slanted coverage would remain neutral because limitations 
would be based on the size of a media company’s portfolio, the company’s 
commitment to objectivity, and the company’s potential political ties, rather 
than the specific content the company’s stations present.294 
As the foregoing overview demonstrates, there has not been a wholesale 
rejection of media regulation.  In fact, regulation has been accepted and 
promoted as protecting the means by which people receive news and 
information.  In instances in which regulation has been supported, a principal 
motivation has been the protection of a diversified media.295  The role that 
government oversight plays in advancing this goal and the Court’s decisions 
upholding such intervention imply that an entirely hands-off approach is 
neither beneficial to viewers nor required by the First Amendment.  Together, 
these conclusions validate the necessity of a national television ownership 
rule that carries weight rather than a rule that is essentially invalidated by the 
calculation method it employs296 or that looks beyond the polarization it may, 
at least in some instances, promote.297  Most broadly, these conclusions 
demonstrate that oversight of the press and the freedom of the press are not 
mutually exclusive. 
In light of the concerns raised by Sinclair’s proposed transaction and 
addressed by courts in other media, this Note now raises two questions:  Do 
the national television ownership rule and UHF discount serve the public 
interest when the consolidations they have facilitated are reviewed in 
hindsight?  Could regular review—and the potential revision—of these rules 
promote the interests the FCC’s regulations purport to advance? 
C.  Conflicting Views Regarding Regulatory Immunity 
The preceding overview establishes that regulating the media is not 
necessarily constitutionally problematic.  Still, reviewing and reforming the 
national television ownership rule requires identifying the appropriate level 
of government oversight that neither renders the relevant rules futile nor 
empowers the government to effectively control the press.  As an initial 
matter, broadcast media ownership regulations are not truly immunity 
provisions,298 even though they permit consolidation that may otherwise be 
prohibited or viewed suspiciously for being anticompetitive in an ordinary 
market.299  In addition, views about “immunity” should not be conflated with 
views about media regulation as a whole.  Arguments against “immunity” 
should be understood as arguments advocating for regulations that promote 
oversight and scrutinize consolidation, while arguments for “immunity” 
 
 294. See supra notes 226–33 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 276–77 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text (illustrating the effect the UHF 
discount had on Nexstar’s ability to reach nearly 70 percent of the national audience). 
 297. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 298. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
 299. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 180, at 18. 
942 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
should be understood as arguments for rules that primarily guard against 
government intervention and that permit and facilitate continued 
consolidation. 
1.  Calls for Increased Regulation 
Proponents of increased regulation and the prevention of media mergers 
would argue that consolidation leads to the homogenization of content.300  
Acknowledging that the connection between consolidation and viewpoint 
diversity must be qualified, there is a strong argument that consolidation in 
local broadcast news has indeed led to content homogenization.301  Because 
such homogenization runs counter to the FCC’s goals of diversity and 
localism, it is reasonable to conclude that increased oversight preventing 
such consolidation would presumably also protect and promote those values. 
Additionally, proponents of increased regulation would likely adopt Judge 
Learned Hand’s conceptualization of antitrust law as a legal framework that 
operates positively to “further[] the First Amendment goal of wide 
dissemination of information and competing viewpoints.”302  Practically, this 
“positive role” is one that prevents “dominant firms” from “lock[ing] down 
monopolies over news stories.”303  This protection could reasonably be 
extended to prevent dominant firms from establishing or maintaining power 
over media through which news and information are disseminated, including 
local broadcast television.  Sitting at the intersection of First Amendment and 
antitrust jurisprudence, this position essentially turns on the belief that 
“[w]herever a dominant position has been attained, restraint necessarily 
arises.”304  When a firm establishes or threatens to establish dominance that 
would interfere with regular market forces, the First Amendment’s 
guarantees demand action that would prevent such dominant actors from 
interfering with competition in the marketplace of ideas.305  Dominant 
positions have been attained;306 thus, some restraint is needed. 
Focusing on the market definition for local television news further 
supports this position.  Even if a firm owned one station in every DMA, one 
 
 300. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media Is 
a Bad Idea, 105 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2012); cf. Martin & McCrain, supra note 25, 
at 373 (finding that there is a substantial supply-side influence on local news content that 
“favors the political and financial interests of [conglomerate] owners”).  But see Ho & Quinn, 
supra note 1, at 860 (concluding from the results of a study of consolidation in newspaper 
ownership that “[n]either convergence nor divergence inexorably follows from 
consolidation”). 
 301. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 302. Crane, supra note 170 (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 
(1943)). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921); see also 
Crane, supra note 170 (“[T]hat today’s marketplace might be characterized by an unlimited 
cacophony of voices would not make it free if those voices were subject to the dominance and 
control of a few firms.”). 
 305. See Crane, supra note 170 (concluding that such intervention protects both 
marketplace democracy and political democracy). 
 306. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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could argue that content homogeneity among those outlets is not problematic 
if the relevant market is defined as the DMA because the sameness would 
only be recognizable among, not within, DMAs.  This is, however, what the 
local multiple ownership rule protects.307  The relevant market for the 
national television ownership rule is a national market.308  Though the 
content concerned or affected by the national television ownership rule is 
local in nature, the audience concerned or affected by it is national.309  
Accordingly, actual or potential content homogeneity on the national level is 
the proper subject of scrutiny.  A firm’s ability to reach a majority of the 
national audience indicates significant concentration in the national local 
news market and may thus be considered a cause for concern.  And, 
practically, deregulation in local media ownership principally advances large 
firms’ interests without producing offsetting benefits, such as a reduction in 
job losses.310 
Finally, opponents of “immunity” would likely also dismiss the 
counterargument that consolidation could support increased viewpoint 
diversity.311  While a larger portfolio of stations provides a firm with more 
flexibility—and potentially reason—to diversify its programming to appeal 
to the widest range of viewers possible at any given time,312 this motivation 
is limited by the extent of the firm’s footprint in each DMA.  Moreover, a 
firm’s ability to broadcast diverse programming is separate from the strategy 
a dominate firm actually implements.313  Because consolidation may 
incentivize firms to centralize operations to cut costs, it is possible that the 
economic gains that consolidation may afford large firms could overshadow 
agendas for diversification.314 
 
 307. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2020). 
 308. See id. § 73.3555(e); see also Martin & McCrain, supra note 25, at 383. 
 309. Cf. National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 3661, 3663 (Jan. 26, 
2018) (noting that the FCC previously found, in 1984, that the national ownership restriction 
was “not necessary to promote the goals of competition or diversity,” yet acknowledging the 
possibility that those conclusions may no longer be valid). 
 310. See generally Connor Raso, What Does “Deregulation” Actually Mean in the Trump 
Era?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-
deregulation-actually-mean-in-the-trump-era/ [https://perma.cc/U7LG-KSUE].  As illustrated 
by the local newspaper industry, consolidation may actually more likely result in job losses. 
See Barry, supra note 96 (discussing newspaper owners’ interest in “siphon[ing] away profits 
rather than reinvest[ing] in local journalism”); David Folkenflik, What Does It Mean When 2 
Giant Newspaper Companies Merge?, NPR (Dec. 3, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2019/12/03/784553287/what-does-it-mean-when-2-giant-newspaper-companies-merge 
[https://perma.cc/P5VW-73B2] (characterizing corporate owners as “aggressive 
cost-cutter[s]”). 
 311. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text; see also Stucke & Grunes, supra note 
300, at 1412 (discussing content homogenization following consolidation in broadcast radio). 
 312. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Edmund L. Andrews, Media Consolidation Means Less Local News, More Right 
Wing Slant, STANFORD GRAD. SCH. OF BUS. (July 30, 2019), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/ 
insights/media-consolidation-means-less-local-news-more-right-wing-slant 
[https://perma.cc/JF25-G9G4]. 
 314. See The Daily:  Taking Over Local News, supra note 195, at 9:40–11:00, 12:35–14:05 
(discussing the centralization of production operations). 
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2.  Challenges to Oversight 
At the most superficial level, the arguments for subjecting media 
companies to more relaxed regulations would be supported by the 
assumption that a lack of government involvement in the media industry 
necessarily equates to the advancement of First Amendment protections.315  
While this argument and its underlying assumption are not entirely insulated 
from debate, this position does not fully appreciate the distinction between 
regulation and control.316  The FCC is expressly prohibited from censoring 
broadcast communications,317 and content-based regulations are subject to 
strict scrutiny.318  And, while the line between content-based and 
content-neutral regulations may not be well-defined in all instances, the fact 
there is a distinction undermines the assumption that all regulation violates 
the First Amendment.319 
Beyond the conflation of regulation and control, advocates for more 
relaxed regulations would likely assert that increased regulation and harsher 
scrutiny would be dangerous in the hands of politically motivated regulators 
and enforcement agency heads.  However, the reinstatement of the UHF 
discount, although deregulatory in nature, was very possibly an example of 
such politically motivated regulatory action.320  This argument for increased 
“immunity” thus overlooks the fact that deregulation is a form of government 
intervention; deregulation does not necessarily equate to insulation from 
government control or influence.321 
Finally, a purely economic approach would be favored by proponents of 
deregulation or “immunity” because consolidation could promote 
efficiencies achieved through economies of scale and scope.322  According 
to Sinclair executives, for example, the loosening of regulatory requirements 
allows well-resourced companies to invest in new equipment and technology 
 
 315. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 316. Cf. Bazelon, supra note 14 (questioning the efficacy of a libertarian approach to press 
regulation). 
 317. 47 U.S.C. § 326. 
 318. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents thus 
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 319. See id. at 642–43. 
 320. See Michael J. de la Merced & Cecilia Kang, TV Station Owners Rush to Seize on 
Relaxed F.C.C. Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/ 
business/dealbook/tv-station-owners-rush-to-seize-on-relaxed-fcc-rules.html 
[https://perma.cc/KL2S-5ZJE] (“Underpinning broadcasters’ dreams of expansion is the hope 
that Ajit Pai, the F.C.C.’s new chairman and a Republican, will let through the kinds of deal 
making that had been held up during the Obama administration.”); see also Kang et al., supra 
note 53 (explaining that the partnership between Pai and David Smith “is a case of a powerful 
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stringency of regulations, as well as eliminating specific disfavored regulatory impacts). 
 322. See The Daily:  Taking Over Local News, supra note 195, at 7:50, 8:40. 
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for the more poorly resourced firms they acquire.323  By this logic, 
consolidation among firms would also facilitate quality improvements that 
would better position local broadcast television to compete with streaming 
and cable companies.324  Though the appeal to quality may seem compelling, 
this position overlooks the value of viewpoint diversity and looks too far 
beyond the relevant market.325  Moreover, a quality-based argument could 
actually cut against the promotion of centrally produced programming 
because such production sacrifices localism,326 which may be framed as a 
factor in quality determinations.327 
III.  INCREASED OVERSIGHT AS A SAFEGUARD 
Even in the contemporary media landscape, local broadcast television 
occupies a uniquely critical role in the democratic society.328  As financial 
and political pressures have set the stage for consolidation in local broadcast 
television, the impact of the industry’s reorganization has made the need for 
the review of broadcast ownership regulations increasingly urgent.329  
Though changes to the national television ownership rule are arguably 
supported by the foregoing analysis, this Note asserts that the rule and the 
UHF discount that is so closely tied to it should, at a minimum, be included 
in the FCC’s quadrennial review.  Moreover, Congress should act to permit 
the FCC to adjust the audience reach cap as the public interest so requires. 
A.  Revising the Rule & Reinstating Regular Review 
Despite any economic efficiency arguments, consolidation is causing 
communities to lose access to coverage of their local governments as rosters 
in newspapers’ newsrooms shrink330 and as television stations are permitted 
to move operations away from the communities they serve.331  While many 
areas of the media industry should be scrutinized in light of the wave of issues 
facing the press today,332 including a recent Supreme Court ruling affirming 
the FCC’s relaxation of other broadcast regulations,333 reviewing the rules 
 
 323. Kang et al., supra note 53; see also Martin & McCrain, supra note 25, at 382; Stucke 
& Grunes, supra note 300, at 1403. 
 324. See Kang et al., supra note 53. 
 325. See supra notes 308–09 and accompanying text. 
 326. See Martin & McCrain, supra note 25, at 373. 
 327. See id. at 383. 
 328. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 329. See supra Parts I.A.2, II.A. 
 330. See Barry, supra note 96. 
 331. See Letter from Robert Menendez & Cory A. Booker, supra note 101 (responding to 
the elimination of an FCC rule requiring broadcast stations to maintain a studio in or near the 
community associated with its license).  See generally Elimination of Main Studio Rule, 82 
Fed. Reg. 57,876 (Dec. 8, 2017). 
 332. See Crane, supra note 170 (“In recent years, as antitrust law has become less 
aggressive on economic terms and technological shifts have enabled a few dominant firms to 
amass immense power over reams of data and the channels of information exchange, the 
questions posed by Holmes and Brandeis are ripe for renewed consideration.”). 
 333. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1160 (2021) (holding that the 
FCC’s decisions to modify local television ownership rules and to repeal rules limiting the 
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governing the ownership of local television stations on a national level is 
particularly important because of the medium’s significance and because of 
the national rule’s unique exemption from regular review.334 
Before Sinclair’s attempted acquisition of Tribune failed, commentators 
feared that regulations supporting continued consolidation could help major 
broadcasters expand their footprints, “particularly in swing states where 
political ad spending surges during election years.”335  Though Sinclair’s 
attempt to expand was avoided, the policy concerns it exposed should not be 
ignored.  Consolidated ownership in local television, regardless of the 
viewpoints the leading firms possess, creates a vehicle by which dominant 
firms may advance agendas in communities across the country and nearly 
ensures that viewpoint diversity is not advanced.336 
Considering the value of local television broadcasting and the influence of 
the national television ownership rule and the UHF discount on the 
composition of the industry, both regulations should be included in the FCC’s 
regular review.337  While these rules have not been precluded from the 
rulemaking process entirely,338 incorporating these regulations into the 
FCC’s standing review would promote more consistent review and enable 
the FCC to determine the appropriate cap for ownership of broadcast 
television stations at the national level, based on conditions in the media 
industry.339  Inclusion in the regular review would also ensure that the rule is 
considered within the context of other broadcast ownership regulations that 
affect the same firms.  Moreover, the ongoing review would encourage 
increased accountability and, somewhat counterintuitively, preserve the 
freedom of the press by guarding against politically motivated or reactionary 
amendments.340 
 
cross-ownership of media was not “outside the zone of reasonableness for purposes of the 
APA”). 
 334. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 335. Lee, supra note 115 (underscoring the political stakes of media ownership regulation). 
 336. See supra notes 243–49 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra Part I.A.5. 
 338. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,124, 21,125 (May 
5, 2017) (“Nothing prevented the [FCC] from issuing a broader Notice at the outset or 
broadening the scope of the proceeding by issuing a further notice to consider whether the 
public interest would be served by retaining the cap while eliminating the UHF discount.”); 
see also National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 3661, 3662 (Jan. 26, 
2018) (“The [FCC] concluded that the CAA did not impose a statutory national audience reach 
cap or prohibit the [FCC] from evaluating the elements of this rule.”). 
 339. See 2018 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 6741, 6743 (Feb. 28, 2019). 
 340. See Michael J. de la Merced, Sinclair Is Said to Be Near a Deal for Tribune Media, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/business/dealbook/sinclair-
is-said-to-be-near-a-deal-for-tribune-media.html [https://perma.cc/HL9T-G4YM] 
(characterizing the timing of Sinclair’s proposed deal as “auspicious”); Ho & Quinn, supra 
note 1, at 862 (arguing for moderate, incremental reform of communications rules); see also 
supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (explaining why the discount was eliminated).  
But see National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21,125–26 (indicating 
that the interconnectedness of the discount and the national ownership cap requires any inquiry 
into the rules’ necessity to be made at once, not independently). 
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The demonstrated impact of consolidated ownership also supports 
reevaluation of the national television ownership rule.  For example, a revised 
rule could account for sham divestitures341 and require an inquiry into any 
direct political affiliations of media companies seeking to consolidate.342  
More simply, a revised rule could have a lower cap, and the UHF discount 
could be eliminated.343  Because the cap and the discount are so closely 
related, any action regarding one should trigger action—or at least review—
of the other.344  Finally, when companies possess portfolios that, through 
proposed acquisitions, would approach the updated audience reach cap, 
regulators could establish specific guidelines for ensuring that the deal does 
not pave the way for future deregulation via modifications that bend to 
current ownership interests.345  While the FCC cannot—and should not—
police the content presented via local broadcast television,346 the call for 
review simply asks the FCC to do for the national television ownership rule 
what it is already doing for other broadcast regulations. 
In a January 2018 rulemaking proceeding, the FCC asked what “public 
interest reasons” supported modification to the national television ownership 
rule.347  The extent of consolidation in local television and the increasingly 
polarized political atmosphere that is advanced, at least in part, by such 
consolidation surely count.348  To the extent that technological advancements 
in the broader media environment have informed revisions to other rules,349 
those findings should also inform the agency’s analysis of the national 
television ownership rule and the UHF discount.350  Finally, the 
consideration of additional or modified guidelines that proactively protect the 
industry from further consolidation constitutes a complex proposal that 
merits the resources, industry-wide context, and agency attention available 
at the FCC’s quadrennial review.351 
 
 341. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
 343. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 3664 (“[N]o 
commenter in the prior UHF discount proceedings presented evidence that the original 
technical justification for the discount is still valid, and the [FCC] . . . did not disturb its earlier 
conclusion that the UHF discount no longer has a sound technical basis following the digital 
television transition.”); supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text. 
 344. See National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21,125–26. 
 345. See 150 CONG. REC. 196 (2004) (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
 346. See supra note 288. 
 347. National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 3665. 
 348. See id.; see also Candeub, supra note 3, at 1551 (asserting that the FCC should focus 
on “protect[ing] the essential function the media serves in a demoncracy,” which is 
“minimiz[ing] the difficulties citizens face in monitoring government”). 
 349. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1157 (2021) (explaining that the 
FCC has rationalized changes in the rules with reference to the “rapidly evolving technology 
and the rise of new media outlets”). 
 350. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
 351. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 862–63 (discussing the complexity of 
consolidation); National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 3665 
(discussing the benefits of comprehensive review); cf. Candeub, supra note 3, at 1609 
(“Before the FCC blocks a merger or limits ownership rights, it must be able to tell a fairly 
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B.  The Insufficiency of Alternatives 
While this Note primarily advocates for regular review of the national 
television ownership rule and the UHF discount and the potential revision of 
the regulations, this section supplements that recommendation by outlining 
the limitations of other measures, such as reliance on divestiture and 
consumers’ access to other information sources. 
Reliance on divestiture is impractical, and it is not a strong enough 
measure for addressing the broader policy concerns associated with 
consolidated ownership.352  First, divested stations may not actually escape 
the control of the party from which they have been divested, depending on 
the structure of the transaction and the parties involved in the divestitures,353 
because divestiture requirements emphasize form over function.354  Formal 
divestiture fails to advance the FCC’s guiding principles if it does not 
promote viewpoint diversity, competition, or localism but instead 
underestimates a company’s actual, practical reach.355 
Next, relying on consumers’ access to many information sources is 
ineffective.  While regulations should be informed by the total media 
landscape, regulations cannot be entirely guided by the general availability 
of information today.356  Relying on the fact that the most broadly defined 
news market is saturated fails to acknowledge the range in quality and 
trustworthiness of other—even locally oriented—sources.  Local broadcast 
television occupies a particular position in the overall media landscape and 
in the democratic society.357  Part of its unique positioning is its focus on—
and relevance to—the local market.358  In terms of quality, the other places 
to which individuals may turn for local information also pose risks of bias 
and misinformation.  Even Americans’ trust in online local news has been 
exploited by “faux-local” sites that either direct readers to polarizing articles 
or rewrite content gathered from sources like politically motivated think 
tanks.359  Further, many local newspapers facing financial struggles have 
folded entirely or moved under the ownership of private equity firms that 
may have no interest in local journalism.360  Such ownership diminishes the 
 
convincing story, either theoretically or empirically, showing that its regulations will 
substantially increase news output.”). 
 352. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 353. See supra notes 209–13, 220–21 and accompanying text. 
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 357. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 358. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
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N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/upshot/fake-local-
news.html [https://perma.cc/3CV2-DUUQ]. 
 360. See Marc Tracy, McClatchy, a Family Newspaper Business, Heads Toward 
Hedge-Fund Ownership, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
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newspaper’s function as a reliable source for at least two reasons.  First, staff 
can be reduced to the point where the due diligence role the paper plays 
cannot be sustained.361  Second, depending on its new owners’ motivations, 
a paper that was once a “watchdog” for local government could be quickly 
transformed into an outlet that replaces investigative reports with “puff 
pieces” benefitting its owners.362 
Relying on the diversity of viewpoints available in the entire media 
industry also depends on the unsupported assumption that people have access 
to all news sources363 and consistently gather their news from all sources 
available to them.364  In short, viewpoint diversity is not significantly 
increased if the other sources that contribute to such diversity are sources to 
which constituents do not—or cannot—pay attention.365  Finally, the internet 
and social media, which have low or no cost barriers,366 should not be 
generally regarded as reliable alternative sources of news and local 
information until baseline media literacy is increased.367 
C.  Other Mitigating Measures 
The issues raised by Sinclair’s attempted acquisition may also support the 
introduction of supplementary mitigating measures beyond the regulatory 
framework—namely, disclosure. 
One issue with the consolidated ownership of local broadcast television 
stations is the lack of transparency regarding ownership.368  Disclosure of 
ownership interests is, therefore, one measure that can be implemented.  
Relatedly, fact-checking and labeling of stories as editorial or opinion pieces 
could similarly put viewers on notice of a segment’s divergence from 




 361. See Jennifer Szalai, Yes, Fake News Is a Problem.  But There’s A Real News Problem, 
Too., N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/26/books/review-
ghosting-news-local-journalism-democracy-crisis-margaret-sullivan.html 
[https://perma.cc/7E4D-UE3L]. 
 362. Id. 
 363. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the accessibility of broadcast 
television). 
 364. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing the preferences of 
consumers of local news). 
 365. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. 
UNIV. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete 
[https://perma.cc/3KB4-47PP] (“[I]f it was once hard to speak, it is now hard to be heard.  
Stated differently, it is no longer speech or information that is scarce, but the attention of 
listeners.”). 
 366. This Note does not address variations in internet access, news sites’ paywalls, or 
membership requirements on social networking sites. 
 367. See Amy Yee, Opinion, To Recognize Misinformation in Media, Teach a Generation 
While It’s Young, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/ 
opinion/truth-media-teach-young.html [https://perma.cc/2J4R-NZPC]. 
 368. See text accompanying supra note 235. 
950 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
against content-based mandates.369  For instance, Sinclair’s defense to 
challenges against its political commentary segments has been the fact that 
they label commentary as commentary.370 
However, the efficacy of even prominently disclosing ownership 
information or the fact that a particular segment is labeled as an editorial or 
commentary segment is limited if the disclosure does not explain its impact 
on the content of the segment.  For instance, even if a local station 
prominently disclosed its ownership by Sinclair, it is not clear that all viewers 
would understand that such ownership means that it is possible that viewers 
may encounter a rightward slant.371  Requiring disclosures or disclaimers 
would also implicate compelled speech concerns, which are beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
These mitigating measures, which are not without their own limitations, 
are not intended to be alternatives to the proposed regular review.  Instead, 
these measures are proposals for protecting the local press until the national 
television ownership rule and UHF discount are reviewed and potentially 
revised. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by both the degree of consolidation in local television 
and the impact such consolidation has had on local television news, increased 
government oversight of the local press may be needed to protect its freedom.  
The first step in pursuit of this goal is challenging the exemption of the 
national television ownership rule and UHF discount from the FCC’s 
quadrennial review and revising both the national audience reach cap and 
calculation method.  This would require the amendment or repeal of the 
provisions that both established the current national audience reach cap and 
removed the rule from regular review.  While increased scrutiny of proposed 
mergers within the media industry would necessarily involve government 
interaction with the press, increased oversight does not necessarily run 
counter to the First Amendment.  Increased government oversight may be 
exactly what is needed to protect the local press today. 
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